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ABSTRACT 
The threat of radiological attack against the United States is viewed as credible, 
imminent, and capable of inflicting lasting negative impacts on domestic society. 
The United States is pursuing detection/denial and public preparedness 
strategies in order to prevent and minimize the effects of a possible radiological 
terrorist attack.  
This thesis surveys the prevalence of radiological material in society, as 
well as major U.S. programs to secure international trade, U.S. borders, and 
radiological material, and to prepare the public in order to determine their 
effectiveness against the threat of radiological attack.  
The research conducted indicates that U.S. government strategies against 
the radiological threat favor costly and problematic technological detection 
programs over public preparedness strategies, which are not optimized or 
resourced to address the general public’s fear of radiation, fatalism toward 
terrorism preparedness, and skepticism of the government as a credible source 
of information on terrorism and radiation. 
This thesis concludes that the government should empower the Weapons 
of Mass Destruction czar with strategic oversight and technology funding-
approval authority to de-conflict and streamline technological detection programs 
at the national level. It should also improve public education outreach resourcing 
and capabilities to increase public preparedness, thereby developing the public 
into a national security asset. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND  
A radiological attack fortunately has not been executed to date, yet three 
analogous cases serve as cautionary tales of the hazards posed by radioactive 
source material. The first is the accidental leak of radioactive cesium-137 and 
subsequent contamination in Goiânia, Brazil, in 1987, by illegal scrap metal 
harvesters, who disassembled a cancer therapy machine. This case serves as 
an indicator of how devastating the contamination and socioeconomic damage 
from a malicious radiological dispersal event could be.1 The second case is the 
1995 planting of several kilograms of radioactive cesium in a Moscow park by 
Chechen separatists, and subsequent recovery by Russian authorities. This case 
demonstrates that possession and use of radiological material by non-state 
actors is a credible threat.2 The third case is the 2001 injury of two Georgian 
woodcutters who were severely burned from a Soviet-era Strontium-90 
Radioisotope Thermal-electric Generator (RTG), which they huddled around for 
warmth, highlighting the existence of orphaned and disused sources of significant 
radioactivity that could be exploited for malicious purposes.3 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
Are the detection, denial and public preparedness strategies employed by 
the U.S. government to combat the threat of radiological attack capable of 
preventing attack and minimizing the effects of an attack?  
 
1 Peter D. Zimmerman and Cheryl Loeb, “Dirty Bombs, the Threat Revisited,“ Defense 
Horizons, no. 38, (2004), http://www.hps.org/documents/RDD_report.pdf (accessed 7 September 
2009).  
2 Michael Specter, “Chechen Insurgents Take Their Struggle To a Moscow Park” The New 
York Times, November 24, 1995, at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/24/world/chechen-
insurgents-take-their-struggle-to-a-moscow-park.html (accessed 26 August 2009). 
3 “Radiothermal Generators Containing Strontium-90 Discovered in Liya, Georgia” Nuclear 
Threat Initiative, at http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/radtutorial/3_moscow.html (accessed 2 
September 2009). 
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C.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
This thesis seeks to investigate various radiological material detection and 
denial and public preparedness programs in order to determine their capability to 
prevent a radiological attack, or prevent such an attack from having a maximal 
impact on society. This thesis will survey non-DoD programs designed to prevent 
a domestic radiological attack. While focusing on domestic protection and 
preparedness programs, this thesis recognizes that some programs, such as 
trade and border security, involve operations overseas, and have been included. 
This thesis is not intended to be all-encompassing of domestic protection and 
preparedness programs, but focuses on several major programs that are vital to 
radiological protection and preparedness.  
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although radiological weapons are Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
under United States law,4 they are not treated as such in academic and 
government literature consistently. The Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) 
threat is frequently differentiated from other WMD regarding the potential for 
mass casualties.5 This bias has resulted in administratively downgrading the 
RDD threat in scholarly writing. In the comprehensive book on the WMD threat, 
America’s Achilles Heel: Nuclear Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert 
Attack, Richard Falkenrath excludes RDDs as a credible threat, citing RDD “low 
lethality,”6 and additionally, that “large quantities of highly radioactive material 
would generally be needed to produce strong [dose] effects over even a 
moderate area.”7 Yet, he cites the main threat of RDDs as one of panic and 
social disruption effects beyond the capabilities of the RDD itself, due to a 
 
4 18 U.S. Code, Sec 2332a. “Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t17t20+1085+3++%28% 
20%20%281 (accessed 22 August 2009).  
5 Richard A. Falkenrath, America’s Achilles Heel: Nuclear Biological and Chemical Terrorism 
and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
6 Ibid., 15. 
7 Ibid. 
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“widespread public fear of radiation”8 resulting in medical infrastructure 
overloading caused by the uninjured “worried well,” as seen after the 2003 World 
Trade Center bombing.9 The outright economic damage through destruction, 
contamination, public fear, and the temporary or permanent loss of an area to 
radiological contamination could cost billions.10      
Recent and prominent government reports on the WMD threat share the 
differential treatment of RDDs as Weapons of Mass Disruption. World at Risk: 
The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 
Terrorism, is silent on the RDD threat specifically, despite the mandate to study 
chemical, biological radiological, and nuclear threats. The commission instead 
elected to “focus solely on the two types of WMD categories that have the 
greatest potential to kill in the most massive numbers: biological and nuclear 
weapons.”11          
An in-depth quantification of RDD isotopes can be found in reporting from 
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) on large industrial source applications 
and proposed alternative technologies.12 The reports propose that of the millions 
of radioactive sources worldwide, the subset of large industrial sources contain 
the amounts of radioactive material that terrorists might seek. The industrial 
applications representing the greatest radiological terrorism threat include 
industrial irradiators, mobile irradiators, research irradiators, Soviet-era seed 
irradiators, teletherapy machines, blood irradiators, RTGs, radiography sources, 
 
8 Falkenrath, America’s Achilles Heel, 15.  
9 Ibid., 6. 
10 Ibid., 7. 
11 Bob Graham et al.,World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of 
WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), xvi.  
12 Gregory J. Van Tuyle et al, “Reducing RDD Concerns Related to Large Radiological 
Source Applications,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, Report LA-UR-03-6664, 2003, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/labs/LAUR03-6%202.pdf (accessed August 24, 2009); 
Gregory J. Van Tuyle and Evelyn Mullen, “Large Radiological Source Applications: RDD 
Implications and Proposed Alternative Technologies,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, report LA-
UR-03-6281, 2003. 
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and well-logging sources.13 These reports provide insights into the chemical form 
and level of radioactivity of threat isotopes, as well as the design and security 
afforded to the industrial application housing them, as well as the implications of 
accessing, concealing, and employing RDD source material.14   
The United States employs various material detection and denial 
strategies to combat the radiological terrorism threat domestically. The Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), under the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), is charged with the mission to protect the homeland from radiological 
material smuggling.15 The DNDO seeks to install radiation detection equipment 
at most U.S. ports of entry and selected interior borders at a projected cost of $2 
billion,16 as well as secure smuggling pathways between official ports of entry by 
small maritime craft, general aviation, or overland routes.  The NRC is 
challenged with ensuring that radiological materials do not fall into terrorist hands 
through manipulation of licensing processes, an area that has proven 
problematic.17   
The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) was established by 
Congress in 2000 as a semiautonomous organization within the Department of 
Energy (DOE).  As part of a comprehensive effort by the United States to combat 
nuclear and radiological terrorism, the NNSA detects, secures, and disposes of 
nuclear and radiological material under a variety of circumstances within the 
United States and abroad.18 
 
13 Van Tuyle et al., “Reducing RDD Concerns,” 1–5. 
14 Gregory J. Van Tuyle et al, “Reducing RDD Concerns Related to Large Radiological 
Source Applications,” 28–30. 
15 “National Security Presidential Directives [NSPD] in the George W. Bush Administration,” 
Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html (accessed 24 
August 2009).  
16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling GAO-09-655, 
(Washington: D.C. GAO, 2009), 2. 
17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Security GAO-07-1038T, (Washington, 
D.C.: GAO, 2007). 
18 NNSA  Web site, at http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/index.htm (accessed 
17 September 2009). 
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FEMA and DHS are pursuing all-hazards public preparedness through 
multiple programs such as Citizens Corps, the Ready Program, and Community 
Emergency Response Teams (CERT) that are designed to increase individual 
and community responsibility and social activism, reducing the impacts of 
disasters on communities.19  
Government oversight reporting has been invaluable in chronicling the 
development of U.S. detection, denial and preparedness strategies. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) illustrates the numerous strategic, 
organizational, and technical hurdles that the government and its agencies face 
in developing effective prevention and preparedness programs.20 Additionally, 
GAO investigative operations to evaluate border security and RDD source 
material interdiction efforts have uncovered significant vulnerabilities. GAO 
investigators, using commercially available software and open source 
information, established dummy corporations, received and subsequently altered 
authentic Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses, and used those 
licenses to fraudulently procure quantities of radiological source materials 
allegedly suitable for use in an RDD.21 GAO personnel, posing as contractors, 
then transported the radioactive materials simultaneously across both the U.S.–
Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders using fake transport documents.22 While 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents were able to detect the radioactive 
material, GAO investigators were not interdicted because Customs and Border 
Patrol personnel could neither recognize false NRC credentials and shipping 
documents, nor verify the authenticity of the documentation through interagency 
 
19 Citizens Corps, “Citizens Corps Councils,” Citizens Corps, http://www.citizencorps. 
gov/councils/ (accessed 9 February 2010); Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
http://www.ready.gov/ (accessed 13 March 2010);  
20 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: GAO-07-347R 
(Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2007), 3. 
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: GAO-06-583T (Washington, D.C.: 
GAO, 2006), 3–4. 
22 Ibid. 
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cooperation with the NRC.23 Such reporting indicates that technological and 
procedural efforts to detect and deny RDD materials may still be vulnerable to 
fraud, pointing to the need to investigate the practical and objective limitations of 
technological threat reduction strategies, and how technological solutions can be 
augmented through the use of other strategies such as public preparedness to 
minimize the effects of a radiological attack. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH      
The United States is undertaking massive efforts to prevent radiological 
terrorism. Such efforts, consisting of denial, detection, and public preparedness 
strategies, cannot realistically achieve perfect protection of the population or 
hope to completely mitigate the impacts on society that perpetrators of a 
radiological attack seek to inflict. These strategies should, however, represent a 
concerted effort to combat the threat, and complement other U.S. strategic 
interests, priorities and policies. This thesis will survey the significant relevant 
programs the government pursues to determine their successes, gaps, and 
opportunities for improvement. In so doing this thesis seeks to make relevant 
policy recommendations regarding detection, denial, and public preparedness 
programs to counter the radiological terrorism threat. By analyzing the 
radiological threat in this manner, variables such as perpetrator motivation are 
set aside and the threat is analyzed such that informed decisions can be made 
about the efficiency and effectiveness of radiological threat reduction measures.  
The dispersal of significant amounts of radioactive contamination 
represents a serious threat to the nation due to the potential for widespread 
contamination of vital territory, economic loss, and detrimental societal impacts. 
Only nuclear WMD surpass the ability of an RDD to deny Americans the use of 
territory for very long periods of time. At issue in a modern, liberal democratic 
society such as the United States is balancing security while facilitating a free 
modern society. The implications of the disruptive effects of an RDD attack 
 
23 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: GAO-06-583T, 3–4. 
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require the nation to carefully evaluate security against economic and social 
freedom. Finite resources and the effects of their misallocation make the 
appropriateness of U.S. security policy importance critical area of study. The 
wrong-headed approach to security can easily create more, and more costly, 
problems than are solved. 
The U.S. has reformed and created various government agencies to 
protect the populace, expending considerable national resources to counter the 
RDD threat, while attempting to avoid restricting society. It is important, then, that 
efforts to protect American society from the threat of radiological attack are 
effective. As John Parachini concludes in the article “Putting WMD Terrorism into 
Perspective,” “Inordinate attention on the comparatively unique challenges of 
coping with unconventional weapons draws scare resources away from the more 
basic but essential activities of law enforcement, intelligence, border and 
customs control, diplomacy, and military action.”24              
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will be organized in the following manner. Chapter I provides 
an introduction, literature review, research questions, organization and scope of 
the thesis.  
The second chapter surveys the prevalence of radioactive sources in 
domestic society, the risk posed by their use in an RDD, the impacts of the 
radiological accident in Goiânia, Brazil, to illustrate the effects of even a small 
radiological terrorist attack on society. The second chapter next surveys several 
major programs the United States pursues towards radiological material 




24 John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism in Perspective.” The Washington Quarterly,  26, 
no. 4 (Autumn, 2003), 48. 
  8
The third chapter surveys the main programs the United States has 
undertaken in the realm of public education outreach and preparedness, to 
determine if those efforts attempt to build resilience against the threat and 
impacts of a radiological attack.   
Chapter IV offers conclusions and recommendations regarding the 
improvement of U.S. detection, denial and public preparedness strategies and 
programs, and discusses conclusions based on this research.  
  9
                                           
II. THE PREVALENCE OF RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL AND 
DOMESTIC PREVENTION PROGRAMS 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the extent to which highly 
radioactive sources are used in society and the potential for terrorist exploitation 
of these materials in a radiological attack, and to survey the major detection and 
denial programs in place to determine how well they are able to detect and deny 
these radioactive materials to terrorists. This chapter will first highlight the 
radioactive sources of greatest concern to RDD terrorism, and then illustrate the 
impact of even a small radiological event by surveying the accidental release of 
radioactive cesium chloride powder in Goiânia, Brazil, in 1987. This chapter will 
next survey some of the major detection and denial programs the United States 
is pursuing to combat illicit radiological material acquisition through trade, border, 
and regulatory security programs.  
A. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL USES IN SOCIETY   
In the United States, over two million radioactive sealed sources are 
licensed for use in thousands of processes that improve the quality of life.25 
Radiological material serves three general purposes: to alter or kill living cells, for 
standalone power generation, and for the scanning and measurement of 
materials.26 Fortunately, the majority of radioactive sources are too small to be 
used in a credible radiological attack. Various larger industrial applications do 
contain quantities of radioactive material that would be readily usable in a 
significant radiological attack, such as a radiological dispersal device (RDD). This 
section discusses the types and prevalence of these larger industrial radioactive 
sources that present a risk for RDD use. 
 
25 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Security GAO-08-598 (Washington, D.C.: 
GAO, 2008), 1.  
26 Gregory J. Van Tuyle et al., “Reducing RDD Concerns Related to Large Radiological 
Source Applications,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, Report LA-UR-03-6664, September 2003, 
16. 
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1. Large Industrial Source Applications 
Large industrial source applications include nine major types: industrial 
irradiators, mobile irradiators, research irradiators, seed irradiators, cancer 
therapy devices, blood irradiators, radioisotope thermal-electric generators 
(RTGs), radiography sources, and well-logging sources.27 These large industrial 
applications are of concern for the amount and type of radioactive materials they 
contain as well as their potential vulnerability to unauthorized access, theft or 
recovery of their source material for use in a radiological attack.         
a. Industrial Irradiators 
Industrial irradiators are fixed facilities, serving functions such as 
the sterilization of equipment and irradiation of food products to kill microbial 
pests. Due to the high investment cost of establishing these facilities, they are 
relatively rare, numbering around 190 facilities worldwide in 2003.28 Industrial 
irradiator facilities are typically designed and built by large Western corporations 
and afforded “significant safety and security features.”29  Yet, industrial irradiators 
are of concern due to the large amounts of radiological material they contain, 
typically hundreds of thousands to millions of curies of activity.   
Besides the overt security practices in place, these facilities can be 
to some extent self-protecting due to potentially fatal levels of radiation near the 
source. These facilities typically utilize hundreds of cobalt-60 source “pencils,” or 
tubes that contain stacks of small cobalt-60 pellets.30 Cobalt-60 has monetary 
 
27 Gregory J. Van Tuyle and Evelyn Mullen, “Large Radiological Source Applications: RDD 
Implications and Proposed Alternative Technologies,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, Report 
LA-UR-03-6281, 2003, 1–5. 
28 T. Strub and Gregory J. Van Tuyle, “Large Radiological Source Production and Utilization 
and Implications Regarding RDDs,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, Report LA-UR-03-5432, 
July 2003,.18. 
29 Van Tuyle et al., LA-UR-03-6664, September 2003, 19. 
30 Ibid. 
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value because it can be recycled in a reactor and reused, reducing the risk that 
cobalt-60 sources will become disused or abandoned.31   
b. Mobile Irradiators 
Mobile Irradiators are irradiators that are built onto modified trucks 
and are designed to accommodate various goods. Mobile irradiators typically 
contain on the order of tens of thousands of curies of gamma-producing 
radioactive material, such as cesium chloride. Their mobility, use of readily 
dispersable cesium chloride, and a lack of information regarding the number and 
location of these devices makes them an item of concern.32  
c. Research Irradiators 
Research irradiators are scaled-down versions of their industrial 
counterparts, and are frequently produced by the same companies. These 
devices are often used for dosimeter calibration, materials research, sterilization, 
biomedical research, and entomology research.33 Research irradiators contain 
on the order of thousands to tens of thousands of curies of radioactivity in the 
form of cobalt-60 or cesium-137.  These irradiators pose risks due to their 
smaller size, significant radioactive material sources, and concerns over the level 
of security that research centers and laboratory facilities may provide.34 
d.  Seed Irradiators 
Seed irradiators were developed and deployed in the Former Soviet 
Union for use in agriculture in the 1970s. Under the Gamma Kolos (Gamma 
Corn) program, truck-mounted systems containing approximately 3,500 curies of 
radioactive cesium-137 were used to irradiate corn and grains in order to study 
the effects on germination rates, induce or prevent germination, and conduct 
 





                                           
research on the potential for creating beneficial mutations.35 The total number 
and location of these systems is unknown, but numbers are estimated at 
between 100 and 1,000 units.36  
e. Cancer Therapy Devices 
Radiation therapy devices focus radiation onto cancerous tissues in 
the body. The cesium sources originally used in teletherapy machines in the 
United States were gradually replaced with cobalt-60 and linear accelerator 
technologies.37 The latest Gamma Knife systems, however, typically contain 
between 3,000–15,000 curies of cobalt-60, in as many as 200 separate 
sources.38  According to the IAEA’s Directory of International Radiotherapy 
Centers (DIRAC), there are approximately 2,749 teletherapy centers in the 
United States.39 Teletherapy devices, like research irradiators, represent a risk 
due to potential facility security vulnerabilities, as well as for their potential to be 
fraudulently acquired.40 
f. Blood Irradiators 
Blood irradiators are filing-cabinet sized machines used to sterilize 
bagged blood in order to prevent Graft-Versus-Host Disease in bone marrow 
acceptor patients and patients who are immunocompromised.41 These devices 
contain a cesium-137 source of between 600 and 5,000 curies of radioactivity. 
The source capsules in these devices are welded into the frame of the machine, 
 
35 Van Tuyle et al., LA-UR-03-6281, 2003, 1–5. 
36  Richard Stone, "The Hunt for Hot Stuff," Smithsonian, (March 2003), 58–65; Van Tuyle et 
al., 2003, 1–5. 
37 Van Tuyle et al., LA-UR-03-6664, September 2003, 22. 
38 Ibid. 
39 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Directory of Radiographic Centers,” International 
Atomic Energy Agency, http://www-naweb.iaea.org/nahu/dirac/login.asp (accessed 17 December 
2009). 
40 Van Tuyle et al., LA-UR-03-6281, 2003, 3.  
41 Van Tuyle et al., LA-UR-03-6664, September 2003, 23. 
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necessitating transport in their entirety for service and source replacement.42 As 
with other medical sources, the site security afforded these devices, their 
portability, and the use of readily-dispersible cesium chloride powder make blood 
irradiators worthy of concern.  
g. Radioisotope Thermal-Electric Generators (RTGs) 
Radioisotope Thermal-electric Generators are portable power 
supplies that rely on radioactive decay to produce heat, which is converted into 
electricity. Terrestrially, RTG deployment to remote areas poses significant risk of 
terrorist exploitation. RTGs can contain up to several hundred thousand curies of 
radioactive material, typically strontium-90, which is highly dispersible.43  
The United States and the former Soviet Union (FSU) have both 
deployed RTGs. The FSU used large RTGs containing strontium-90 as 
lighthouses from the 1960s through the 1990s along remote northern coastal 
areas.44 There have been numerous instances of vandalism of Soviet RTGs, 
typically by scrap metal harvesters, prompting concerns that terrorists might 
harvest the radioactive material from one.45  
The United States deployed RTGs in a variety of applications both 
inside and outside the United States. The U.S. Air Force maintained ten RTGs in 
Alaska as part of a seismic sensor array on Burnt Mountain,46 while the Navy 
deployed numerous RTG configurations to provide power in remote locations for 
navigation beacons, communications relays, remote weather stations, seismic 
 
42 Van Tuyle et al., LA-UR-03-6664, September 2003, 23. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 24–25. 
45 Joby Warrick. “Makings of a 'Dirty Bomb: Radioactive Devices Left by Soviets Could Attract 
Terrorists,” The Washington Post, 18 March 2002, A01. 
46 Department of Energy, “EA considers DOE sites for storage of RTGs” The SRS 
Environmental Bulletin,  12, no. 1, 9 February 2001 
http://www.srs.gov/general/pubs/envbul/2001.htm (accessed 3 March 2010). 
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sensor arrays, and various buoyed and deep ocean sensors.47 The Navy also 
made RTGs available for loan to other federal government entities.48 RTGs 
supported these missions in the United States, Alaska, remote Pacific islands, 
the Arctic, Antarctica, and various oceans.49  
h. Radiography Sources 
According to Los Alamos National Laboratory, over 10,000 new 
radiography sources are sold every year, and loss and theft are not 
uncommon.50 These mobile sources are typically used for inspection purposes, 
such as the inspection of welds at construction sites. Older sources may contain 
cobalt-60 and cesium-137, and aggregating these sources could create a potent 
RDD. Most new radiography sources contain isotopes with shorter half-lives, 
such as iridium-192.51 This is advantageous because nuclides with shorter half 
lives do not pose as great a threat of long-term contamination in a radiological 
attack scenario. Iridium-192, for example, has a half-life of 74 days.52   
i. Well-Logging Sources  
Well-logging sources are typically used by multi-national oil and 
mining companies for exploration and assessments of subterranean geology, 
and typically contain a neutron source in the 15–20 curie range, as well as a 
cesium source with activity in the tens of curies range for conducting geologic 
density scans.53 There are thousands of sources in use worldwide. These units 
 
47 Naval Nuclear Power Unit,” Radioisotope Thermal-electric Generators of the United States 
Navy,” 10, United States Navy, 1 July 1978. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid.,  





                                           
are highly mobile, typically carried on trucks, and are sometimes shipped 
between countries, raising concerns of theft during transport and use.54 
B. RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL TRAFFICKING  
With radioactive material prevalent in modern society, the opportunities 
and potential for radioactive material smuggling and terrorist use are numerous. 
Radioactive material is created and shipped worldwide on a daily basis, 
presenting risks throughout the material life cycle as it is produced, transported, 
distributed, sold, used, transferred, consolidated, and disposed of.  
While the prevalence of radiological material in society points to a 
potential vulnerability for terrorist use, radiological material smuggling is in fact a 
global threat. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit 
Trafficking Database (ITDB), there have been 1,562 confirmed incidents of illicit 
trafficking of nuclear and radiological material reported worldwide by participating 
nations from 1993 through 2008. Of these incidents, 336 incidents involved illegal 
possession and related criminal activities. Additionally, 421 incidents involved 
reported theft or loss, and primarily involved radioactive sources such as cesium-
137, americium-241 strontium-90, cobalt-60, and iridium-192. In 65% of reported 
cases during this time period, lost or stolen materials have not been recovered. 
From 2004-2008, the unrecovered material rate increased to around 73%. Un-
recovered materials consist of IAEA Category 2 and 3 “dangerous” radioactive 
sources.55 
C. IMPACTS OF AN RDD EVENT: GOIÂNIA, BRAZIL 
The impacts of a domestic RDD attack are worrisome. Aside from the 
potential death and destruction that an explosively dispersed RDD might cause 
outright, the radioactive contamination presents a complex, far-reaching, and 
enduring problem for the targeted society beyond contamination issues. While an 
 
54 Van Tuyle et al., LA-UR-03-6664, September 2003, 26. 
55 International Atomic Energy Agency, “ITDB Factsheet September 2009,” International 
Atomic Energy Agency, http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.htm (accessed 5 January 2010).  
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RDD attack such as a dirty bomb has not yet occurred, the accidental release of 
radioactive cesium chloride powder in Goiânia, Brazil in 1987 illustrates the 
destructive potential and long-term effects that the dispersal of even a small 
quantity of radioactive material can have, and raises questions about the impacts 
a larger, deliberate release might have on a society.56  
The IAEA report on the Goiânia accident revealed that the accident in 
Goiânia began on 13 September 1987, when two scrap metal scavengers 
removed a teletherapy machine assembly containing 1,375 curies of cesium 
chloride powder from an abandoned radiotherapy clinic.57  The men later 
disassembled the device, puncturing the cesium chloride source capsule. After 
sale to a junkyard, the powder was discovered and distributed to family 
members, who applied the powder to their bodies in the manner of Carnival 
glitter.58  
Between 21 and 24 September, the wife of the junkyard operator fell ill 
with acute radiation sickness. Her mother cared for her for two days, and then 
returned home outside of town, spreading contamination to her own residence. 
The mother would later be diagnosed as having ingested an estimated 270 
microcuries of cesium, giving her a dose of around 430 rads.59 This dose is near 
the 500-rad lethal dose for half the population (LD50), yet she survived.60 The first 
diagnosis of radiation poisoning was made on 28 September, when the wife of 
the junkyard operator and one of the junkyard employees put the source capsule 
in a plastic bag and took it by bus to a clinic where it was shown to a doctor.61 
 
56 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiânia, (Vienna: 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1988). 
57 Ibid., 1, 11, 23. 
58 Ibid., 23–24. 
59 Ibid., 24. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 24–26. 
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In all, 112,000 people (10% of the population of Goiânia) were monitored 
by Brazilian and IAEA response personnel. Of those, 249 were contaminated.62 
Significantly, 129 people suffered both internal and external contamination, 
having inhaled or ingested radioactive material.63 Forty-nine individuals required 
hospitalization; 20 were highly contaminated, 10 required critical care.64 In all, 
five people died.65  
In terms of the environmental impact, contamination was localized to an 
area of about one square kilometer, in which 85 structures were found to have 
significant levels of radioactive contamination.66 Seven homes were condemned 
and destroyed, while 42 of 159 homes required decontamination.67  In total, 
3,500 cubic meters of contaminated debris (approximately 115 22-ft trailer loads) 
were generated from the cleanup effort, requiring storage and environmental 
monitoring.68  
Goiânia was also affected by social and economic impacts of the event. 
The association of the accident to the Chernobyl reactor accident in the Soviet 
Union the year before had a strong psychological impact on the Brazilian 
population, and many people feared contamination, irradiation and incurable and 
fatal diseases.69 Some discrimination towards the inhabitants of Goiânia 
occurred, and sales of agricultural products, the economic lifeblood of Goias 
State, fell by a quarter in the year after the accident,70 and only after five years 
did sales return to pre-1987 levels.71 
 
62 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiânia, 2. 
63 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiânia, 36. 
64 Ibid., 134. 
65 Zimmerman, 2004, 4. 
66 IAEA, 3. 
67 Ibid., 4. 
68 Ibid., 5. 
69 Ibid., 115. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Joseph Magill and Jean Galy, Radiation, Radionuclides, Radiation, (Springer, Berlin: 
2004), 162.  
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Notably, intense public and political pressure was cited as playing a major 
role in recovery from the accident. In determining remediation standards, the 
standard for the decontamination of homes was set at one-tenth of 
recommended IAEA action levels.72  It is likely that the scope of mitigation of any 
future RDD incident will also be heavily politicized, magnifying the effects of the 
RDD event itself and pointing to the need for an open dialogue on this issue.  
In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the 
lead responsibility to provide radiological emergency planning guidance, known as 
Protective Action Guides (PAGs), to protect the public from radiation exposure.73 In 
2006, DHS also issued PAGs for use in the event of an RDD or improvised nuclear 
device (IND), with the primary goal of protecting the public by providing the 
standards necessary to guide the early and intermediate phases of incident 
response.74 These PAGs may be used by federal agencies and state governments 
to develop their own public health guidance and regulations. Ultimately, PAG 
guidance are recommendations and not legally enforceable or binding.  
PAGs do not establish cleanup levels. Cleanup standards would be 
determined from a post-event evaluation of the contamination, and would depend in 
part on the uses of the site with consideration for the lifetime exposure that the 
contamination creates. A site that is used for business purposes for 8 hours per day 
would not require the same level of decontamination as housing would, where 
people might receive exposure 24 hours a day.75 While state and local authorities 
make the ultimate decisions under most scenarios, public involvement in politically-
charged decisions regarding acceptable contamination standards and 
decontamination efforts would play a crucial role in determining the magnitude of 
the impact of the event on society. PAGs therefore represent an important 
component of incident response and community education and preparedness.   
 
72 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiânia, 4.  
73 Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Security GAO-08-598, (Washington, D.C.: 
GAO, 2008), 40. 
74 Ibid. 
75 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-598, 2008, 42. 
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D. U.S. RADIOLOGICAL DETECTION AND DENIAL STRATEGIES 
With radiological materials prevalent in society, and radiological accidents 
such as occurred in Goiânia to illustrate the severe impacts of an RDD event, it is 
imperative that the detection and denial strategies the United States pursues are 
effective and sustainable. Radiological detection and denial is a significant 
undertaking. The United States has 327 official Ports of Entry (POE), consisting 
of maritime port terminal facilities, official border crossings, and international 
airports. The United States borders with Canada and Mexico total 12,034 
kilometers, and the U.S. coastline is approximately 19,924 kilometers long.76 
According to CBP, a typical day in 2008 involved the processing of over 70,000 
cargo containers and over one million passengers and pedestrians across U.S. 
borders.77 This section first describes the analysis the major detection and denial 
programs the United States is pursuing to prevent radiological terrorism. The 
research will show that despite great progress in several areas, significant 
technological, administrative, and operational gaps remain that make the 
prospect of radiological material detection and denial highly problematic.  
After 9/11, DHS took a tripartite approach in countering the threat of 
clandestine radiological attack, by expanding existing programs, developing 
overarching programs to enhance existing efforts, and conducting research and 
development on improved radiation portals.78 DHS expanded radiation detector 
deployment programs including the Radiation Portal Monitor Program and the 
fielding of handheld and portable detectors to CBP and the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG). In 2006, the 2006 Security and Accountability For Every Port Act (SAFE 
Port Act) formally authorized the establishment of the DNDO within DHS, and 
charged it with developing an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture and 
 
76 CIA World Factbook. ”United States,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/ (accessed 17 December 2009.  
77 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “Snapshot: A Summary of CBP Facts and Figures.” 
Customs and Border Protection. Washington, D.C. March, 2009. 
78 Dana Shea, The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress-RL34564, 
Congressional Research Service, July 7, 2008, CRS-2. 
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further implementing the domestic portion of it. The SAFE Port Act also 
established programs and requirements central to countering the threat of 
nuclear and radiological weapons and material smuggling through U.S. ports.  
The primary focus of U.S. efforts towards prevention of an RDD attack or 
radioactive material smuggling domestically has thus been on protecting the 
global supply chain through detection of illicit trafficking of radiological material. 
The major organizations involved in domestic radiological material 
detection and denial programs are the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
its component agencies, notably the DNDO and CBP, and the USCG. DHS 
works closely with the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State 
(DOS), DOE, and the NRC in developing the global nuclear detection 
architecture.79  
To meet its mandate to develop an enhanced global nuclear detection 
architecture, the DNDO conducted an assessment of existing U.S. efforts and 
found approximately 72 federal programs operating worldwide.80 The DNDO 
identified the largest potential gaps for RDD/radiological material smuggling as 
air, land, and sea pathways between official ports of entry.81 The DNDO’s 
strategy includes reducing existing stocks of nuclear materials, protecting 
existing materials from theft or diversion, detection and reporting of illegal 
material movements overseas, and improving domestic capabilities to detect 
radioactive materials and interdict them.82   
The DNDO conceived of the defense against the RDD threat as a global 
nuclear detection architecture, involving a layered, defense-in-depth concept that 
 
 
79 Shea, The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, 1. 
80 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Detection GAO-08-999T, (Washington 
D.C.: GAO, 2008), 13. 
81 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security, Congressional 
Justification FY2009, The DNDO RD&O-8. 
82 Department of Homeland Security, “The DNDO Overview,” 2008, 
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb270/20.pdf, slide 5, (accessed 19 November 2009). 
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is international in scope. The architecture is composed of three layers–exterior, 
border, and interior, each presenting multiple opportunities for authorities to 
detect and interdict threat materials.83 
In developing a layered, defense in-depth strategy that involves numerous 
stakeholder agencies throughout government, the DNDO utilizes personnel 
detailed from CBP, TSA, USCG, as well as the Departments of Energy, Defense, 
Justice, State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to meet its mandate. The 
DNDO also works in close partnership with the National Laboratories, academia, 
and private industry for scientific expertise and research support. Through the 
utilization of personnel detailed from inter- and intra-agency partner 
organizations, and close coordination with security stakeholders in all levels of 
government in the architecture development process, the DNDO seeks to 
determine the nature of the requirements for the global nuclear detection 
architecture, and serve as the technology development and fielding conduit to 
those federal, state, and local agencies that will ultimately operate it. To this end 
the DNDO has created a national test bed for radiation detection technologies at 
the Nevada Test Site.84  
Some of the significant global nuclear detection architecture programs 
within the global nuclear detection architecture aimed at protecting the U.S. 
homeland include programs operating beyond U.S. borders, including the 
Container Security Initiative, (CSI), the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), the Second 
Line of Defense program (SLD), the Megaports Initiative, and the Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). Additionally, architecture programs at 
the border and within the interior include CBP monitoring of maritime, aviation, 
and vehicular traffic at and between official ports of entry, as well as programs 
like the DNDO’s  Secure the Cities, NRC’s materials licensing program to include 
 
83 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress 
in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols OIG-08-19,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_ 
08-19_Dec07.pdf (accessed 15 February 2010), 15.  
84 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling GAO-05-840T 
(Washington D.C.: GAO, 2005), 7. 
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Web-Based Licensing (WBL) and National Source Tracking System (NSTS), and 
NNSA’s Off Site Recovery Program (OSRP). 
1. Programs to Secure Global Trade and Prevent Smuggling 
a.  Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
CBP further seeks to identify high-risk seaborne cargo prior to it 
reaching U.S. borders. Initiated in January 2002, the Container Security Initiative 
involves the identification and inspection of cargo containers that pose a risk to 
U.S. security while the containers are still in foreign ports. CBP, in partnership 
with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, target and prescreen containers 
and develop investigative leads regarding potential terrorist threats from cargo 
destined for the United States.  
CBP uses automated targeting tools to identify containers that pose 
a threat of terrorism based on strategic intelligence. Section 203 of the SAFE 
Port Act directs CBP to collect cargo information from importers and vessel 
carriers of non-bulk cargo in advance cargo loading procedures at foreign ports. 
Shippers and container vessels bound for the United States are required to 
transmit specific information to CBP 24 hours prior to departure from the foreign 
port.85 The data are known collectively as the “10+2 Rule,” and formally as the 
Importer Security Filing (ISF) and refers to 10 data items that importers must 
submit prior to loading, to include:  
 Seller 
 Buyer 
 Importer of record number/foreign trade zone identification number  
 Consignee number(s) 
 Manufacturer or supplier 
 Ship to party 
 Country of origin 
 
85 SAFE Port Act, Public Law no. 109-347, 109th Congress, 2nd session, (13 October 2006), 
Sec. 203.  
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 Commodity  
 Harmonized Tariff Schedule number of the United States (HTSUS)  
 Container stuffing location  
 Consolidator name and address86   
The “+2” additional data elements must be submitted by vessel carriers and 
includes ship stowage plans and container status, such as empty or full. Failures 
to meet the 24-hour advance submission requirement results in barring the cargo 
from loading.87  
For prescreening of containers at port of departure, CBP relies on 
the Automated Targeting System (ATS)  to determine the relative risk score of a 
given shipping container. Mandated by the SAFE Port Act, ATS uses computer 
algorithms to assess the shipping data to determine the need for further 
investigation.  Additionally, CBP employs large-scale Non-Intrusive Inspection 
(NII) capabilities such as x-ray and gamma ray machines, as well as passive 
radiation portal monitors and handheld radiation isotope identifiers.88  
b.  The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) 
The Secure Freight Initiative began as a pilot program mandated by 
the SAFE Port Act to discern the potential for scanning all U.S.- bound cargo 
containers in order to prevent terrorist nuclear or radiological attacks and 
smuggling via the global supply chain. CBP and DOE, in partnership with the 
State Department announced the SFI in December 2006.89 The SFI is a 
voluntary coalition of terminal operators, cargo carriers, and shipping companies 
 
86 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “ Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier 
Requirements,“ http://www.cbgov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/carriers/security_ 
filing/sfi_carriers_lxml, August 2009 (accessed 11 January 2010).  
87 Michael Chertoff, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security, (Statement 
for the Record Before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs), March 1, 2006, 4.  
88 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CSI In-Brief,” http://www.cbgov/xp/cgov/trade/ 
cargo_security/csi/csi_in_brief.xml, March 20, 2008 (accessed 17 December 2009).  
89 Department of Homeland Security. “Secure Freight Initiative: Vision and Operations 
Overview,” Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_ 
1165943729650. shtm (accessed 17 December 2009).  
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that agree to develop operations that facilitate greater security efforts. The vision 
of the SFI program is to create an integrated, global detection and information 
network that shares real-time container x-ray and radiation detection data with 
countries engaged in maritime trade.90 The SFI pilot program is reciprocal, 
allowing foreign countries to request the United States to scan 100% of cargo 
bound for their ports.91 
The SFI builds upon both CSI and DOE’s Megaports Initiative by 
integrating the data from these two programs.92 Under the SFI, container 
screening combines x-ray imaging with radiation monitoring. DHS provides non-
intrusive imaging systems to host governments, while DOE deploys radiation 
portal monitors, optical character recognition systems, and the communications 
systems necessary to integrate and pass the data from the systems to the host 
government and U.S. officials.93 Radiation alarms or suspicious x-ray data are 
immediately reported to the host port’s government for local resolution. U.S.-
bound container data is provided to U.S. Customs officials at the foreign port and 
is also sent back to the CBP’s National Targeting Center in Virginia. There, the 
data is incorporated into other risk assessment systems to determine the need 
for further investigation.94 While SFI was established at seven foreign ports 
located in Pakistan, Honduras, the United Kingdom, Oman, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Hong Kong, operations have culminated at the ports of Hong Kong 
and the Southampton, United Kingdom.95 
 
90 Department of Homeland Security. “Secure Freight Initiative.” 
91 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Supply Chain Security GAO-10-12, (Washington, 
D.C.: GAO, 2009), 5, 9.  
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According to the GAO, The SFI program has met with limited 
technical success, is hampered by problems regarding funding, logistics, and 
international cooperation, and threatens global cooperative customs frameworks 
that have resulted in the feasibility of 100% scanning of U.S.-bound cargo 
remaining unproven.96  
Under SFI, scanning rates from 54-86% were achieved at low-
volume ports responsible for less than 3% of U.S. container shipments, and no 
participating port achieved 100% scanning of U.S.-bound cargo.97 Larger SFI 
ports, with a majority of their container cargo bound for the United States, did not 
achieve scanning rates above 5%.98 SFI ports encountered challenges related to 
worker safety concerns, scanning of intermodal cargo, equipment breakdowns, 
and poor quality images of scanned cargo, prompting concerns among  CBP 
officials are concerned that they and the participating ports cannot overcome the 
numerous problems faced.99 
Problems regarding participation, funding, and international 
cooperation have surfaced as well. Scanning at the port of Busan, South Korea, 
was allowed at only one of eight terminals, while the ports of Hong Kong and 
Southampton ceased participation when their support agreements with CBP 
expired.100 Customs officials in the United Kingdom withdrew personnel allocated 
to the program when the 6-month agreement it had with CBP expired, citing 
personnel costs that prevented the fulfillment of counter-drug and other domestic 
responsibilities.101 As a result, SFI at Southampton is a unilateral endeavor, 
wholly supported by CBP officers and the terminal operator.102 Hong Kong port 
officials cited that CBP’s statistics showed no trade facilitation benefits for 
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container scanning operations, and that they saw no incentive to SFI participation 
in terms of their own port security.103 Further, officials were concerned that 
equipment and infrastructure costs and impacts on efficiency would make full 
implementation at all terminals unworkable.104 
In 2007, the 9/11 Act mandated the screening of all U.S.-bound 
cargo containers by July 2012 before SFI feasibility was established, and without 
identifying funding responsibility.105  GAO points out that no agency has 
performed a cost estimate to implement the program, while CBP and DOE have 
spent about $100 million to equip six SFI ports through June 2009.106 DHS 
officials told GAO they anticipate continued U.S. funding for the majority of 
program implementation costs.107  
GAO also notes that full SFI implementation departs from customs 
practices that are both globally accepted and risk-based.108 The World Customs 
Organization (WCO) Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE) 
Framework, was itself created by CBP and 11 member states of the High Level 
Strategic Group, and is based on U.S.-conceived incentives like reduced 
inspections for shippers practicing supply chain security.109 In effect, the U.S. is 
unilaterally changing the rules to a “scan everything” policy. In 2008, the 
European Parliament and WCO member nations advocated repealing the 100% 
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although the 9/11 Act does not mention reciprocity, CBP notes foreign nation 
intentions to seek U.S. reciprocity, something CBP does not have the manpower 
to support.111   
Recognizing the problems of full implementation, DHS and CBP 
plan to use the “10 +2” rule and a “strategic trade corridor strategy” to scan 100% 
of U.S.-bound containers at foreign ports where CBP determines the greatest 
WMD smuggling risks.112 In the interim, DHS has decided to extend the 
implementation deadline given the potential trade impacts.113   
c. The Second Line of Defense Program (SLD) 
The Second Line of Defense program is an DOE/National Nuclear 
Security Agency (NNSA) effort to improve foreign government capabilities to 
detect and deter nuclear and radioactive smuggling in maritime shipping and 
across international borders, primarily in the former Soviet Union. NNSA works 
with foreign governments to provide border crossings, airports, and seaports with 
radiation detection equipment, training, and initial sustainment support until the 
host government can assume operational responsibility.114  SLD encompasses 
two programs: the SLD Core Program, and the Megaports initiative. The Core 
Program seeks to install radiation detectors at 500 border, airport, and strategic 
feeder seaports within 32 countries. An agreement with Russia will put detectors 
in 350 border crossing locations by the end of 2011.115   
d. The Megaports Initiative  
The Megaports Initiative is a DOE/NNSA partnership with foreign 
countries that also seeks to prevent nuclear or radiological material smuggling 
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via the global trade network. Begun in 2003, the Megaports Initiative seeks to 
install detection equipment at 100 seaports and scan 50% of global maritime 
container cargo by 2015. Under the program, DOE/NNSA provides foreign 
countries with radiation detection technologies and training of personnel. In 
return, NNSA requires the sharing of data regarding detection and seizures of 
radioactive materials resulting from the use of the equipment.116 
As of August 2007, installation at eight ports was completed by 
DOE: Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Piraeus, Greece; Colombo, Sri Lanka; 
Algeciras, Spain; Singapore; Freeport, Bahamas; Manila, Philippines; and 
Antwerp, Belgium (Phase I).117 In 2008, operational testing was ongoing at four 
additional ports: Antwerp, Belgium (Phase II); Puerto Cortes, Honduras; Qasim, 
Pakistan; and Laem Chabang, Thailand.118 Additionally, DOE had signed 
agreements to begin work and is in various stages of execution at ports in 12 
additional countries, including the United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates/Dubai, 
Oman, Israel, South Korea, China, Egypt, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, 
Colombia, Panama, and Mexico, Taiwan and Hong Kong.119 Several of these 
ports are also part of the Secure Freight Initiative. DOE is also engaged in 
negotiations with approximately 20 additional countries in Europe, Asia, the 
Middle East, and Latin America.120 
e. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
The CBP established C-TPAT in 2001. C-TPAT is a voluntary, 
government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen 
and improve overall international supply chain and U.S. border security. Under C-
TPAT, security is achieved through the close cooperation of CBP and global 
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supply chain stakeholders, to include importers, carriers, consolidators, licensed 
customs brokers, and manufacturers, who validate their supply chains and 
security procedures with CBP. Once validated, these low-risk companies enjoy 
such benefits as reduced customs inspection rates and expedited cargo release 
procedures at U.S. ports of entry.121 From 2003 to 2008, CBP had conducted 
over 8,000 supply chain validations.122   
f. Radiation Screening at and Between Official Ports of 
Entry 
Customs and Border Protection seeks to protect U.S. borders while 
fostering travel and trade. CBP screens cargo and vehicles for radiological 
material at land ports of entry using stationary radiation portal monitors. Vehicles 
drive through the portals, which trigger an alarm when radiation is detected. CBP 
officers then conduct a secondary inspection, using a second portal to confirm 
the alarm, and handheld radioactive isotope identifiers to determine if the source 
material is a threat.123 
In 2007, the DNDO completed Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) 
deployment to the Nation’s 22 busiest seaports as mandated by the SAFE Port 
Act, and by the end of 2007, claimed that 98% of all in-bound containerized ship 
cargo was screened for radiation using 358 RPMs.124 Concurrently, in-bound 
container-screening rates for trucks along the northern border using 241 RPMs 
and along the southern border using 343 RPMs reached 91% and 97% 
respectively.125 Personally Owned Vehicle (POV) traffic is also screened at the 
northern and souther borders, and, in 2007, 81% of northern border POV traffic 
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was screened, while 92% of POV traffic was screened at the southern border.126 
Additionally, 60 RPMs were deployed to mail and courier processing facilities.127 
g. Maritime Security Efforts 
Container ships are not the only maritime pathway for illicit 
radionuclide material to enter the United States. Other potential threat pathways 
include small vessels, which are recognized in the DHS Small Vessel Security 
Strategy but are not mandated for screening under the SAFE Port Act. Small 
vessels are defined  as any watercraft, regardless of method of propulsion, 
generally less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or commercial 
purposes, and include those used for recreation, commercial fishing, towing, and 
un-inspected passenger vessels, or any other small commercial vessels involved 
in foreign or U.S. voyages.128 The DNDO’s West Coast Maritime Pilot Program is 
one effort to combat the threat of small vessel nuclear and radiological attacks 
and smuggling. 
The West Coast Maritime pilot program is a three-year, $10 million 
pilot program begun in 2007 to provide maritime radiation detection capabilities 
for state and local authorities in Washington’s Puget Sound and California’s San 
Diego areas. The program, conducted in close coordination with USCG and 
CBP, involves radiation detection architecture development that reduces the 
threat of illegal transportation of radiological weapons or material aboard 
recreational or small commercial vessels.  
The goal of the pilot program is to evaluate the efficacy of the use 
of radiation detection equipment and operations by local maritime authorities in 
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order to develop techniques that can be used in securing other high-risk ports.129 
Under the pilot program, the DNDO is deploying and testing passive detection 
sensors, such as human-portable radiation detection equipment, mobile sensors, 
and fixed-position detectors for use by local maritime authorities to include the 
U.S. Coast Guard. Operational procedures, training, and exercises that support 
small vessel radiation detection capabilities are also in development.130 In 2008, 
the DNDO and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) conducted a test to 
characterize radiation detection performance of commercially available boat-
mounted radiation detectors in the maritime environment.131 In September 2009, 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and DNDO, along with law 
enforcement and first responder personnel from USCG, CBP, FBI, as well as 
Washington state, county, port and local law enforcement participants, conducted 
another maritime exercise in Puget Sound to assess hand-held and boat-
mounted detector technologies and develop operational protocols.132 According 
to the GAO, as of 2009 the DNDO had not established criteria for evaluating pilot 
program success, nor estimated costs of expanding the program to other 
facilities if feasible.133 
h. Intermodal Rail 
Intermodal rail detection is also currently under development. Two 
percent of shipping containers arriving in the United States are intermodal rail 
 
129 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces West Coast Maritime Radiation 
Detection Project,” Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_ 
1189012515699.shtm, 5 September 2007 (accessed 11 Jan 2009); see also Geoffrey Harvey, 
“High-tech Nuke Detectors Check Puget Sound Small Vessels for WMD,” Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory Web site, http://www.pnl.gov/news/release.aspx?id=405, 24 September 2009 
(accessed 22 January 2010). 
130  Department of Homeland Security, “West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection Project,” 
2007. 
131 Savannah River National Laboratory, “SRS Test Program Honored By Department Of 
Homeland Security,” November 20, 2008, srnl.doe.gov/newsroom/2008news/crawdad.pdf 
(accessed 11 January 2009).  
132 Harvey, “High-tech Nuke Detectors.” 
133 U.S. General Accountability Office, Nuclear Detection GAO-09-257, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. General Accountability Office, 2009), 5. 
  32
                                           
containers, or those that are offloaded from ships onto railcars for further 
transport. These containers exit port facilities without passing through the 
radiation detectors used to screen tractor trailers. To address this gap, the SAFE 
Port Act mandated that the DNDO establish an intermodal rail test center.134 The 
DNDO selected the port of Tacoma, Washington, in 2007 as the site for the test 
center because 70% of inbound ship containers are bound for intermodal rail.135 
Projects at the intermodal rail test center include scanning cargo at the dockside, 
during transport to the rail yard, entering the rail yard, in the container storage 
stack, during train assembly, and upon train departure from the port.136  
i. General Aviation Security 
In 2009, around 2,000 international commercial flights and another 
400 international general aviation flights arrived daily in the United States.137 
With more than 19,000 general aviation facilities operating within the United 
States, at urban, rural, and remote airports nationwide,138 general aviation 
presents a significant threat pathway for the smuggling of radioactive material or 
RDDs. In April 2007, DHS Secretary Chertoff tasked the DNDO and CBP with 
conducting radiation screening of all general aviation aircraft arriving in the 
United States from international locations, which DHS achieved by the end of 
2007.139 CBP hopes to have cargo screening technologies in place at the 30 
airports that receive 99% of inbound aviation cargo by 2014.140 
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In December 2008, the DNDO’s systems engineering and 
evaluation directorate initiated a pilot program named the Passenger and 
Baggage Pilot Program, or PaxBag. The pilot program goal is to address the 
scanning of commercial airline passengers and baggage traveling through U.S. 
international airports to determine if they are carrying any illegal radiological or 
nuclear materials. The PaxBag pilot program seeks solutions for the detection of 
sources of gamma or neutron radiation emissions at or near real-time, as well as 
the detection of low-activity radiological materials that may be masked, or 
shielded by a variety of materials.141     
E.  MATERIALS LICENSING, TRACKING, AND RECOVERY 
In addition to radionuclide detection strategies, procedures for licensing, 
inspecting, and regulating radiological material and those with access to it is a 
critical piece of radionuclide detection and denial strategies. Even perfect 
technological detection measures will fail if potential terrorists are able to defeat, 
circumvent, or manipulate regulatory measures in order to fraudulently acquire 
radiological materials for malevolent purposes.  
1.  NRC Material Denial Efforts  
The NRC regulates the security and accountability of nuclear and 
radiological materials in the United States. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
section 274, the NRC may relinquish to the states portions of its regulatory 
authority to license and regulate byproduct materials (radioisotopes); source 
materials (uranium and thorium); and certain quantities of special nuclear 
materials. According to the GAO in 2007, there were 22,000 radiological material 
license holders in the United States.142    
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Prior to 9/11, the NRC’s mission focus was primarily one of safety, in 
preventing nuclear and radiological materials from harming people. The attacks 
on 9/11 hastened the broadening of the NRC’s mission focus, highlighting the 
need for improved material security. In 2005, the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) 
amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and added important changes to 
improve radionuclide security.  
The EPAct established the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task 
Force chaired by the NRC. The task force is a consultative body comprised of 
representatives from DHS, DOD, DOT, DOJ, DOS, DNI, CIA, FEMA, FBI, HHS 
and the EPA. Additionally, the Organization of Agreement States serves as a 
non-voting member of the task force.143 The purpose of the task force is to work 
with stakeholder agencies at all levels of government to recommend legislative 
and regulatory measures concerning radiation source security to the U.S. 
government.  
The EPAct requires the task force to issue its recommendations in a report 
to Congress and the President every four years, concerning the areas of threat 
radionuclides, storage and transportation security, loss and transfer reporting, 
national tracking, import and export, disposal, alternative technology 
development, inspections and penalties, and personnel and site security. Once 
received, by Congress, the NRC then has 60 days to initiate policy changes as 
the Commission deems appropriate, and to ensure timely compliance by the 
Agreement States.144  
Other important provisions of the EPAct included creation of a national 
source-tracking system, establishment of time limits for licensee reporting of 
transfer, loss, or theft of a radioactive source, and the amendment of section 149 
of the Atomic Energy Act to authorize NRC to conduct fingerprinting and criminal 
background checks of persons with access to high-risk levels of nuclear and 
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radiological materials. The EPAct also mandated that the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) conduct a study of radionuclide uses to determine the potential 
uses for which radionuclides might be replaced with nonradioactive technologies 
or substituted with radionuclides that present less of a risk to public health and 
security.145  
Significantly, key investigations into NRC licensing procedures by the 
GAO in 2005 and 2007 have demonstrated the persistence of critical 
vulnerabilities in the material licensing process despite increased security 
practices after 9/11, illustrating the potential for terrorist exploitation of regulatory 
systems to obtain radiological materials. 
In 2005, GAO investigators used commercially available software and 
open source information to establish dummy corporations and download and 
subsequently alter sample NRC material licenses. Investigators then successfully 
used those licenses to fraudulently procure quantities of radiological sealed 
sources allegedly suitable to make two RDDs.146 GAO investigators then posed 
as U.S. contractors, and transported the radioactive materials simultaneously 
across both the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders using the fake NRC 
documents and bills of lading.147  
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While CBP agents were able to detect the radioactive material, the 
material was not interdicted because CBP could not detect fraudulent possession 
of the material. CBP personnel could neither recognize false NRC credentials 
and shipping documents, nor had they the capability to verify the authenticity of 
the NRC license through interagency cooperation or technical reachback with the 
NRC.148  
In 2007, GAO conducted parallel investigations of both NRC and 
Agreement State licensing procedures. GAO investigators again established 
dummy corporations and applied for material licenses from both the NRC and an 
Agreement State.149 The Agreement State informed the GAO investigators that 
an on-site inspection would be required prior to license issuance, while the NRC 
did not mandate an on-site inspection, and issued a license within a month.150 
GAO investigators subsequently altered the license, removing language 
restricting the amount of sealed sources the (fake) company could possess, in 
order to demonstrate that potential terrorists could aggregate lesser quantities of 
threat material from suppliers into quantities that could be used in an RDD. 
Investigators sent copies of the doctored license and letters of intent to purchase 
devices and received quotes from two suppliers for the purchase of IAEA 
Category 3 “Dangerous” quantities of source materials.151  
Both in response to these investigations, as well as due to existing 
security measure developments mandated by the EPAct, the NRC has 
developed additional strategies to reduce the likelihood of illicit radionuclide 
material acquisition, including the National Source Tracking System (NSTS), 
Web-based Licensing (WBL), and the License Verification System (LVS).  
Efforts to reduce access to radionuclides include the NRC’s National Source 
Tracking System (NSTS), Web-based Licensing (WBL), and the License 
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Verification System (LVS), and NNSA’s Off-site Recovery Program, which 
provides physical removal of radioactive source material. 
2.  NRC’s National Source Tracking System (NSTS) 
The concept of a national source-tracking system resulted from a 2002 
joint NRC and DOE working group to identify threat radionuclides and potential 
methods for increasing their security.152 A national tracking system requirement 
was later mandated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and the NRC’s NSTS 
became operational in January 2009. The NSTS is a secure web-based 
database designed to track the life cycle of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources 
regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Agreement 
States from “cradle to grave,” from when sources are manufactured or imported, 
until they are exported, disposed of, or decay to a non-hazardous level.153 The 
goal of the NSTS is to improve public health and safety and the common defense 
by improving the ability of the NRC and Agreement States to conduct inspections 
and investigations, communicate information to other government agencies, and 
verify the legitimate ownership and use of radioactive material.154  
In order to combat the threat that lesser activity sources might be 
acquired and aggregated into a high-risk level, the NRC issued a proposed rule 
in April 2008 to expand the NSTS to include not only Category 1 and 2 sources, 
but also 1/10 of the Category 3 threshold.155 This action would have resulted in 
additional licensee reporting to the NSTS applications including fixed industrial 
measuring devices like thickness gauges, blast furnace gauges, and pipe 
gauges, as well as well-logging devices, brachytherapy sources in the medium- 
to low-dose range, and some additional radiography devices. The NRC 
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Commission has not enacted the provision as a final rule due to a split vote by 
Commission members on the final decision.156 
3.  Web-Based Licensing (WBL) and License Verification System 
(LVS) 
NRC’s WBL and LVS are complementary programs to NSTS, and are 
currently under development. The objective of WBL is to provide licensing data to 
businesses dealing in radioactive materials. While NSTS will track sealed 
sources “cradle to grave,” WBL will do the same for NRC material licenses, and 
include information from initial license application, date of issuance, amendment, 
reporting, and de-licensing of NRC licensees. WBL will also have an interface to 
support Agreement States licensee data management.157  
The License Verification System (LVS) will verify domestic licensees, 
interfacing with WBL and NSTS to detect and preventing illicit material 
acquisition. LVS will ensure license authenticity, licensee authorization to procure 
materials by quantity and type, and that licensee inventories are in compliance 
with  authorized  possession  limits.158 With  WBL  and LVS,  the  threat of using 
fraudulent licenses to acquire radionuclide material and attempts to bypass 
authorization limits through simultaneous acquisition from multiple vendors 
should be greatly reduced.  
4.  NNSA/DOE Offsite Recovery Program (OSRP) 
The OSRP is a U.S. government activity supported by NNSA’s Office of 
Global Threat Reduction and is managed by the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory. The OSRP mission is material denial 
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through the removal of excess, unwanted, abandoned, or orphan radioactive 
sealed sources that pose a risk to health, safety, and national security.159 OSRP 
was originally established in DOE’s Office of Environmental Management in 1999 
for the recovery of sealed sources of Greater than Class C (GTCC) low-level 
radioactive waste. After 9/11, the OSRP mission expanded in consideration of 
broader public safety and national security concerns. As a result, OSRP 
transitioned to NNSA in 2003, and includes the recovery of transuranic material 
as well as beta/gamma emitting sealed sources.160 NNSA works in close 
cooperation with the NRC to identify sources for recovery. Through December 
23, 2009, OSRP recovered more than 21,323 sources domestically, and 495 
sources from foreign locations, preventing their recovery and use in an RDD.161  
F.  INTERIOR DETECTION 
1.  Securing the Cities Initiative 
Unveiled by the DNDO in May 2006, the Secure the Cities Initiative 
seeks to expand the global nuclear detection architecture to protect major 
U.S. urban areas. The pilot program was established in New York City and 
seeks to assess threat pathways into major cities, such that radiation 
detection assets and procedures can be implemented to combat the threat. In 
2010, the Obama administration will provide $18.5 million for radiation monitor 
installation in bridges, tunnels and regional toll plazas.162 While New York 
remains the only city to participate in the program, adoption of H.R. 2611 
would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to include expansion of 
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program funding in 2010 to introduce the program in two more locations, with 
costs through 2014 estimated at $206 million.163   
G.  ARCHITECTURE BUDGETS 
In 2007, Congress budgeted a total of approximately $2.8 billion to the 74 
programs involved in the prevention and detection of nuclear and radiological 
material smuggling.164 Approximately $1.1 billion in funding was appropriated for 
28 programs focused on internationally-based architecture; $918 million funded 
16 programs for detecting and securing radiological or nuclear material inside 
U.S. borders; $221 million in support of 9 programs concentrating on at-the-
border radiological and nuclear detection programs; and $577 million spread 
across 34 programs involving multiple layers of architecture such as research 
and development or technical support.165 
Regarding the portal monitors to be used for screening cargo at U.S. ports 
of entry, in September 2008 GAO estimated the life cycle costs (deployment and 
maintenance) of each standard cargo version of the ASP at approximately 
$822,000. PVT life cycle costs were estimated at $308,000 for the standard 
cargo portal. Total program costs for the DNDO’s latest deployment plan, which 
relies on both ASPs and PVTs for detection, yet does not deploy radiation portal 
monitors at all border crossings, is estimated at about $2 billion.166  
H. ARCHITECTURE TECHNOLOGIES  
The global nuclear detection architecture relies on a few core technologies 
for radiation detection. These technologies consist of larger sensor arrays used 
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in radiation portal monitors for cargo container screening, to smaller, mobile 
systems for vehicle, backpack and handheld detection and radionuclide 
identification, to pager-sized radiation detectors worn by law enforcement and 
first responders.  
1.  Radiation Portal Monitors 
Fixed portal monitors consist of two upright columns, forming a portal 
between which cargo containers pass as they are moved through port facilities.  
The DNDO has been developing and testing portal monitors utilizing three sensor 
technologies: polyvinyl toluene (PVT), sodium iodide (NaI), and high-purity 
germanium. Each technology has benefits and drawbacks to their use. 
PVTs make up the bulk of radiation portal monitors, and were widely 
deployed in the wake of 9/11 due to their relatively low cost and reliable detection 
capability. As of July 2008, there were over 1,070 RPMs in service at U.S. air, 
sea, and land ports of entry.167 PVTs detect gamma radiation emanating from a 
vehicle or cargo container when it strikes the polyvinyl toluene scintillator 
material, creating small photo-electric disturbances that are detected by the 
PVT’s electronics, which then trigger an alarm notifying CBP personnel that 
radiation has been detected. 
But, PVTs have drawbacks. PVTs are unable to distinguish between 
threat sources and benign Normally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM), 
such as glazed ceramics, kitty litter, fertilizer, and bananas, which are commonly 
traded commodities. PVTs therefore have a high nuisance alarm rate, potentially 
problematizing the efficient flow of the high volumes of cargo that pass through 
busy seaports and border crossings. CBP manpower is used in the adjudication 
of nuisance alarms, and a high-volume port experiences hundreds of these 
nuisance alarms daily.     
 
167 The National Research Council, Evaluating Testing, Costs, and Benefits of Advanced 
Spectroscopic Portals for Screening Cargo at Ports of Entry, (Washington, D.C.: National 
Academies Press, 2009), 11. 
  42
                                           
For neutron detection, PVTs rely on helium-3 detection technologies. The 
portals contain plastic tubes filled with helium-3 gas, which is a non-reactive 
decay product of the tritium gas used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons. 
Neutrons emitted from the radioactive material pass through the tubes of helium-
3 gas, and are absorbed, producing tritium, protium, and energy. The protium in 
turn reacts with He-3, producing charged particles and energies, which are 
detected by the sensor electronics, triggering an alarm.168     
The DNDO is currently in the development and testing phase of more 
advanced radiation portal monitors for cargo screening: Advanced Spectroscopic 
Portals (ASPs). ASPs utilize either high-purity germanium or sodium iodide 
crystals to detect gamma radiation. These materials allow the ASP to measure 
the discrete energy levels produced, either by looking at the energy peaks of the 
radiation detected or by analyzing the spectrum or “fingerprint” of energies 
produced. These data are then compared to an onboard database of spectra for 
nuclear, radiological, and NORM material. Spectral matches for threat 
radionuclides results in the ASP triggering an alarm, whereas matches for NORM 
do not alarm. This gives the ASP the added capability to not only detect radiation 
but to identify the source radionuclide, potentially reducing the nuisance alarms 
inherent in PVT detectors.  
2. Isotope Identifiers and Radiation Pagers 
CBP personnel are also issued hand-held radiation isotope identifiers 
(RIIDs). USCG personnel have similarly been issued backpack radiation 
detectors. These detectors are more advanced than PVTs and radiation pagers 
because they are more sensitive, and like ASPs, have the ability to identify 
specific isotopes. 
CBP began providing its inspectors at U.S. borders and points of entry 
with small, personally-worn radiation detection devices, known as radiation 
 
168 Massachusetts institute of Technology, “Helium-3 Proportional Counters,” 
http://web.mit.edu/8.13/www/tgm-neutron-detectors.pdf (accessed 15 February 2010).  
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pagers, in FY 1998. After 9/11, DHS expanded this effort. Radiation pagers share 
the PVTs non-discriminatory radiation detection properties. According to DOE 
officials, radiation pagers have a limited range and are not designed to detect 
weapons-usable nuclear material.169 Relatively inexpensive, the pagers are 
nonetheless useful for the passive screening of individuals and passenger 
vehicles at ports of entry to detect other, more highly radioactive materials. 
I.  CHALLENGES TO DETECTION AND DENIAL STRATEGY EXECUTION 
Much controversy has surrounded the global nuclear detection 
architecture. The main areas of critique surrounding the architecture are 
technological limitations, feasibility, and administrative issues. 
1. Technological Limitations 
Nuclear materials like HEU and plutonium produce low levels of radiation, 
meaning that they can be shielded or masked by legitimate cargoes that are 
more radioactive. Shielding involves placing a dense material around the 
radionuclide so that the radiation it gives off is absorbed before it reaches the 
detector. Masking involves using a higher-level radioactive material to hide the 
radiation signature of a lower level source from the detector. Effective shielding 
and masking of nuclear materials makes it difficult for even sensitive passive 
detectors like ASPs and PVTs to detect those materials. DNDO officials 
acknowledge that passive detectors like PVTs and ASPs can only detect certain 
nuclear materials if they are unshielded or lightly shielded.170 
Interestingly, nuclides desirable for use in RDDs are comparatively much 
more highly radioactive than special nuclear material. This characteristic makes 
them more readily detected by passive radiation detectors.  RDD isotopes thus 
require greater shielding than nuclear materials, making them harder to smuggle. 
 
169 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-840T, 2005, 3. 
170 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-655, 2009, 7. 
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According to Los Alamos National Laboratory, shielding of radionuclides presents 
additional opportunities for detection of heat and density signatures.171 
The technological limitations and costs of RPM technology has caused 
leaders to question the DNDO’s pursuit of the more expensive ASP technology. 
The 2007 Appropriations Act prohibited the obligation of funding to procure ASP 
systems until the DHS Secretary certified that ASP technology provides a 
markedly improved level of performance than current radiation portal monitors.172 
This is an important caveat, as the PVT monitors cost about $340,000–$455,000 
per unit, while ASPs cost around $822,000 per unit, prompting GAO to report that 
cost overruns in the ASP monitor program could amount to over $1 billion, for a 
total cost of $3.8 billion to $4 billion.173 
2. Resource Constraints        
In testimony before the Investigations and Oversight Committee, House 
Science and Technology Committee, Dr. William Hagan, acting deputy director of  
the DNDO, stated that the ASP program was put on indefinite hold due to a 
severe shortage of the helium-3 gas that is used in radiation portal monitors for 
neutron detection.174 Helium-3 is a natural decay product of the Tritium gas used 
to boost the yield of nuclear weapons. The supply of helium-3 has been 
decreasing since the end of the Cold War and a reduction of U.S. nuclear 
forces.175 The helium-3 shortage resulted in the price of helium-3 skyrocketing, 
 
171 Gregory J. Van Tuyle, et al., Reducing RDD Concerns Related to Large Radiological 
Source Applications,” Report LA-UR-6664, Los Alamos National Laboratory, September 2003, 
23.  
172  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. no. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2069 (2007); 
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. no. 
110-329, 121 Stat. 3574, 3679 (2008).  
173 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling GAO-08-1108R, 
(Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2008), 4. 
174 Testimony of Dr. William Hagan, acting deputy director, Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office, Department of Homeland Security, before the Investigations and Oversight Committee, 
House Science and Technology Committee, 17 November 2009.  
175 Matthew L. Wald, “Shortage Slows a Program to Detect Nuclear Bombs,” The New York 
Times, pg A-12, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/us/23helium.html, 23 November 2009 
(accessed 7 January 2010). 
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necessitating a suspension in the continued development and fielding of the 
RPM portion of the DNDO’s detection architecture. In a November 2009 letter to 
DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight advised the DHS Secretary to scale back the ASP 
program and focus on improving the PVT monitor technology.176 
3. Lack of an Over-Arching Strategic Plan or Centralized 
Authority 
The DNDO has driven forward on development of the global detection 
architecture, but there appears to be no overarching strategic plan developed to 
shape its efforts. The DNDO identified 74 federal programs that deal with the 
threat of nuclear and radiological smuggling domestically and overseas. While 
the DNDO has actively sought to coordinate its activities with other stakeholder 
agencies, the overarching program requirements and performance objectives 
governing DOD, DOE, DOS, and DHS efforts that would assist in the integration 
various programs into a more collaborative and cohesive defense, are largely 
unarticulated.177 This high-level lack of strategic planning is problematic for 
domestic protection, since the implementation and management of various 
“similar-but-distinct” programs domestically and overseas has great potential for 
the duplication of effort, waste, and lack of information sharing and interagency 
cooperation.          
4.  Remaining Gaps in the Architecture 
While great effort has been undertaken to secure much of the global 
supply chain and ports of entry, other potential pathways still present significant 
vulnerabilities. The SAFE Port Act of 2006, for example, exempts bulk cargo and 
approved break bulk cargo from radiation screening. It is unclear whether such 
 
176 Re Brad Miller, Letter to DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, Washington, D.C., 20 Nov. 
2009. 
177 The DNDO has acknowledged that it has started work on such an integrated strategy, but 
it is not known to the extent the effort is pursued in other agencies. U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, GAO-09-257, 2009, 6-9. 
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cargoes are ultimately screened when they  leave the port by rail or truck. Given 
the nascent status of intermodal rail cargo screening, bulk cargoes may not be 
getting screened prior to departing the port facility.  
Detection and interdiction of radionuclide smuggling along DNDO-
recognized pathways as general aviation, land areas between official ports of 
entry, and small maritime vessels are also in stages of feasibility assessment or 
early development, but more importantly, are potentially resource prohibitive to 
secure to a high degree of effectiveness. The inherent limitations of passive 
detection as demonstrated by the poor detection of shielded nuclear materials, 
and shortages of key raw materials point to a need for additional technological 
and operational development.   
GAO investigations into NRC licensing highlight that procedural measures 
are just as critical as technological measures to detect and deny RDD materials 
to would-be terrorists. Security measures to track sources, such as the NSTS, 
rely on user-input reporting. Recognizing that successful terrorist attacks like 
9/11 utilized key personnel with no criminal background, operating lawfully within 
existing social institutions, points to the continued potential for regulatory 
measures to remain vulnerable to deception, and that the investigation and 
background checks of individuals with access to radioactive material will play an 
increasingly important role in material security.   
J. CONCLUSION 
While there is no single solution to the threat of radiological terrorism, it is 
imperative that the various strategies that make up the DNDO’s layered defense-
in-depth are conceived, developed, deployed, operated and maintained in such a 
manner that each program stands a reasonable chance at success, and that 
together they stand a high probability of success. The current and future 
domestic detection and denial strategy is by no means perfect. At issue is the 
ability to keep very small quantities of highly dangerous materials from illegally 
entering or transiting the country by diverse methods. Reducing the largest 
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potential threats, such as that posed by smuggling of weapons or material using 
international container shipping, is prudent. Currently, the global supply chain is 
much more secure than it was prior to 9/11. However, strategies across potential 
threat pathways are in various stages of development and implementation, and in 
some cases are probably several years from security, if at all.  
Importantly, the presence of significant gaps and limitations in various 
pathways and a lack of feasibility data has not stopped the United States from 
pursuing aggressive security standards such as the 100% screening of U.S.-
bound cargo, while defenses against other threat pathways, such as small-craft 
maritime smuggling, are comparatively nascent. Further, limitations of the 
passive radiation detection technology itself, as well as in the raw material 
resources that support it, point to a need for not only developing and 
implementing alternative and complementary screening technologies for 
domestic radiation detection, but also for development of an over-arching 
strategy that places effective assets where they can to make detection and denial 
strategies  as  effective  as possible.  Unilateral  efforts on the part of the United  
 
States may erode international cooperation on both economic and security fronts, 
where such cooperation is most needed, without a commensurate improvement 
in national security.  
The Goiânia incident demonstrates the important role that political 
decisions play in disaster remediation. The magnitude of the impact of an RDD 
event is only partly determined by such factors as target location, type, amount, 
and effectiveness of dispersal, and amount of contamination present. Goiânia 
illustrates that potential contributing factors are the adequacy of response and 
medical assets to mitigate the immediate and long-term contamination and health 
hazards, public reaction and public order effects, and political decision making.   
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III. PUBLIC EDUCATION OUTREACH 
In July 2009, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet 
Napolitano said before the Council on Foreign Relations:  
For too long we've treated the public as a liability to be protected 
rather than an asset in our nation's collective security … We need a 
culture of collective responsibility, a culture where every individual 
understands his or her role.178  
Is the government developing the public as a national security asset 
against radiological terrorism? Chapter II showed that the United States is 
pursuing considerable effort across a range of detection and denial programs to 
protect the American public. This chapter analyzes the concurrent levels of effort 
with which the government is developing the “public asset” in regards to security 
against the RDD threat.  
A sound strategy to prevent radiological terrorism from having a maximal 
effect on society should devote adequate resources to increasing public 
resilience. This chapter will determine and evaluate public preparedness 
measures the United States government is pursuing. This chapter will first 
determine public perceptions of radiological terrorism, to show that public 
preparedness efforts are needed. Next, this chapter will discuss the programs of 
responsible agencies that facilitate public education and preparedness efforts 
and their levels of resourcing, in order to determine if public preparedness 
resourcing is in line with technological programs towards achieving security.  
The research will show that government preparedness and threat 
education programs for the public are focused on all-hazards, post-event efforts 
which do not improve RDD threat security, and do not begin to reach the levels of 
resourcing committed to the no less problematic detection and denial strategies 
discussed in Chapter II.  
 
178 Janet Napolitano, “Remarks by Secretary Napolitano at the Council on Foreign Relations,” 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_ 1248891649195. 
shtm (accessed 5 January 2010). 
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A.  PUBLIC FEAR OF RADIATION AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM 
Public perception of radiation and radiological terrorism demonstrates that 
there is a critical need for building public resilience against the RDD threat. The 
popular fear of radiation is evidenced in risk perception studies and fostered in 
the public mind by ongoing high-level disagreement over radiation dose safety 
limits and recurrent radiation incidents and accidents.  The threat of radiological 
terrorism in preparedness studies shows that significant government efforts are 
required to prevent public fears of radiation from multiplying the effects of an 
RDD attack.  
Public fear of radiation has been demonstrated in scientific studies on risk 
perception and public opinion polls regarding threat perceptions. Research into 
popular risk perception in the 1980s has shown, even prior to Chernobyl, that 
individuals’ “cognitive maps” of risks associated with nuclear weapons, nuclear 
fallout, and nuclear power included perceptions that “these risks are unknown, 
dreaded, uncontrollable, inequitable, catastrophic, and likely to affect future 
generations.”179 The disparity between scientific and public perceptions of 
radiation caused one physicist to conclude that “the public’s understanding of 
radiation dangers has virtually lost all contact with the actual dangers as 
understood by scientists.”180   
Public fears regarding radiation are further borne out in more recent public 
opinion polls. In a 1991, Gallup poll of 2,404 American adults on public attitudes 
towards nuclear radiation, respondents were asked: “When you hear the word 
"radiation," what are some of the things that come to mind?”181 The top ten 
responses by percentage were: 
 
 
179 Paul Slovic, “Perceptions of Risk,” Science, 26, no. 4799, (April 1987), 285. 
180 Ibid., originally from B. L. Cohen, Before It’s Too Late: A Scientist’s Case for Nuclear 
Energy, (New York: Plenum, 1983), 31. 
181 Attitudes Towards Nuclear Radiation, The Gallup Poll: 22 January 1991 (accessed 2 
March 2010), http://institution.gallucom/documents/question.aspx?question=41473& 
Advanced=0&SearchConType=1&SearchTypeAll=radiation. 
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Nuclear Power 14.97% 
Death 12.29% 
Bombs/Explosions 11.26% 
Cancer Treatment 11.03% 
Dangerous/Harmful 10.89% 
Sickness/Illness (General) 9.17% 
Heat 7.03% 
Microwaves 6.45% 
Table 1.   Top ten responses associated with the word “radiation”182  
Tallying up the percentages of respondents who perceive radiation 
negatively, while throwing out the response “Bombs/Explosions” as attitude-
neutral, shows that nearly 49% of respondents view radiation negatively. 
According to the National Council on Radiation Protection and 
Measurements, public fear of radiation is enhanced by several elements:   
 Radiation risks are perceived as new and uncertain.  
 Radiation-related technologies are viewed as complicated.  
 Radiation accidents are thought to be beyond individual control.  
 Radiation-producing technologies like nuclear power plants are 
considered by many to be both dangerous and nonessential.  
 Historical occurrence of radiological accidents and catastrophes. 
 Radiation effects elicit strong emotions due to the association with nuclear 
weapons.  
                                            
182 Attitudes Towards Nuclear Radiation, The Gallup Poll: 22 January 1991. 
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 Radiation effects are thought to affect future generations.  
 Radiation accidents are perceived to have global consequences, i.e. 
“fallout.”  
 Radiation is not detected by human sensory organs.  
 Radiation causes diseases like cancer.183 
A roundtable discussion on the psychosocial impacts of an RDD event 
conducted by the CDC similarly found negative perceptions of radiation, including 
that “there is no safe radiation dose,” and “safe equals no risk whatsoever.”184 
Perhaps more importantly, clinicians and public health workers themselves feel 
unprepared to respond to radiological terrorism. Charles Miller, the CDC’s Chief 
of the Radiation Studies Branch of the National Center for Environmental Health, 
stated that some research even indicates a potential unwillingness of medical 
staff to report to work in a radiological event due to contamination fears, and that 
“some hospitals have flat out said that their first response in a radiological event 
would be to call security and lock down the hospital.”185 
Public fear of radiation also stems from conflicting expert opinion of 
harmful radiation dose thresholds. The Linear No Threshold Hypothesis (LNTH) 
hypothesizes a linear relationship between radiation dose and adverse health 
effects, meaning any exposure above zero is potentially harmful.186 Used as a 
guiding principle for radiation protection,187 LNTH opponents, such as the Health 
 
183 National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements,  “Commentary no. 10, 
Advising the Public About Radiation Emergencies: A Document for Public Comment,” National 
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, 30 November 1994, 6. 
184 Centers for Disease Control, “Roundtable on the Psychosocial Challenges Posed by a 
Radiological Terrorism Incident: Participants’ Comments, Ideas, and Recommendations, A 
Summary Report,” 6-7 December 2005, 3-4, www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/rt-psychosocial.pdf 
(accessed 22 Feb 2010). 
185 Ibid. 
186 International Commission on Radiation Protection, “Low-dose Extrapolation of Radiation-
Related Cancer Risk,” 10 December 2004, 9, http://www.icrorg/remissvar/viewcomment. 
asp?guid={641B1D71-7E2E-4897-A197-F5CD184A9713 (accessed 22 February 2010).  
187 B. John Garrick, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, Letter to NRC 
Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson, 4 June 1999, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/acnw/letters/1999/1090144.html (accessed 19 February 2010). 
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Physics Society, maintain that actual dose, rather than hypothetical exposure 
risks, should be used to determine safety standards.188 LNTH supporters 
meanwhile argue that there is insufficient scientific evidence regarding the effects 
of low-radiation dose to warrant departure from LNTH use.189 In Permissible 
Dose, J. Samuel Walker illustrates how the plight of atomic veterans exposed 
during weapons tests, the publicity surrounding questionable studies on low-level 
radiation exposure, and the recurrence of nuclear accidents and incidents have 
resulted in interagency infighting over regulatory authority, and served to both 
fuel and fail to solve the debate on safe radiation dose limits in the mind of the 
public.190  
Radiation experiments and accidents have also fostered the public fear of 
radiation. In addition to the open-air nuclear weapons tests of the 1950s and 
1960s, the U.S. government engaged in experiments involving the intentional 
release of radiation. One such experiment, “Green Run,” authorized the 
deliberate release of thousands of curies of radioactive Iodine-131 from the 
nuclear site in Hanford, Washington, in 1946. The secret experiment was 
designed to test Air Force radiation monitors, and resulted in numerous claims 
from downwind communities that the experiment contributed to cancers and 
other health problems.191  
The reactor accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 prompted Pennsylvania 
Governor Richard Thornburgh to issue a limited evacuation of pregnant women 
and preschool-aged children from the vicinity of the plant. However, the 
evacuation produced over 200,000 evacuees, who fled an average of 100 
 
188 Health Physics Society, “Ionizing Radiation Safety Standards for the General Public,” 
PS005-3, February 2009, Health Physics Society, http://hps.org/hpspublications/ 
positionstatements.html (accessed 22 February 2010).  
189 Garrick, 1999. 
190 J. Samuel Walker, Permissible Dose, (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 2000), 79, 
91–95.  
191 Washington State Department of Health, “The Release of Radioactive Materials from 
Hanford: 1944-1972” Washington State Department of Health, http://www.doh.wa.gov/ 
hanford/publications/history/release.html#Green (accessed 22 February 2010). 
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miles.192 Recalling in Chapter II that the accident in Goiânia resulted in over 
110,000 people seeking contamination monitoring, while 248 were found to 
actually be contaminated, is further evidence of people not only harboring fears 
of of radiation, but acting on them.   
Most famously, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor explosion in 1986 displaced 
hundreds of thousands of people, spread contamination across Europe, and led 
to predictions of tens of thousands of cancer deaths.193 A subsequent study by 
the United Nations in 2005, however, indicates that Chernobyl’s impact was 
much less than initially predicted. Despite predictions of 4,000 deaths, Chernobyl 
has caused much fewer, including some 50 deaths of mostly emergency 
workers, and nine adolescent thyroid cancer deaths.194 Predicted increases in 
infertility and birth defect rates did not occur, and the long-term cancer rates 
among the affected population may increase one percent or less.195 Importantly, 
the report found that misperceptions regarding the threat of radiation has caused 
a “paralyzing fatalism” among affected residents.196 Some 7 million people in the 
region receive government benefits and subsidies, but discussions of reducing 
those benefits due to Chernobyl’s less-than-anticipated impacts are politically 
unpopular.197  
Not only does the public hold negative perceptions of radiation, but also 
views radiological terrorism as a credible threat that the government lacks the 
 
192 Kai Erikson, “Radiation’s Lingering Dread,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,  47, no. 
2, (March 1991), 35. 
193 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism:  The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 7. 
194 Peter Finn, “Chernobyl’s Harm Was Far Less Than Predicted, U.N. Report Says,” The 
Washington Post, 6 September: A22 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2005/09/05/AR2005090501144.html (accessed 2 Mar 2010). 
195 Ibid. 
196 The United Nations, “Chernobyl: The True Scale of the Accident,” The United Nations, 9 
June 2005, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/dev2539.doc.htm (accessed 2 March 
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197 Ibid.  
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ability to prevent. A poll of 500 potential voters conducted by the Radiological 
Threat Awareness Coalition (RTAC) in 2008 yielded the following results:  
 81% of voters believe that the dirty bomb threat to the U.S. is serious 
 70% of voters had not taken steps to prepare for a terrorist attack 
 66% of voters believe that the government cannot prevent a dirty bomb 
attack  
 56% of voters were not confident they know what to do in the event of 
a dirty bomb attack 
 64% of voters believed the government was not doing a good job 
informing people about preparedness for a terrorist attack   
 14% of voters believe the government is the most credible information 
source on terrorist threats198 
Similarly, the 2009 Citizens Corps National Survey of 2,400 respondents 
nationwide found that 33% of respondents felt confident in their abilities to react 
to a dirty bomb event, while 75% expressed confidence in reacting to a natural 
disaster.199 Among the reasons given for not taking steps to prepare for various 
disasters, 35% of respondents expressed fatalism regarding terrorist attacks, 
believing that no preparation could help them deal with an act of terrorism.200 
Regarding radiological terrorism, only 19% of respondents said they knew how to 
respond in the first five minutes after a dirty bomb attack, while 62% felt that they 
did not know what to do. 
Possibly, people’s misperceptions of radiation and feelings of dread 
regarding the potential impacts of radiation has resulted in fatalistic attitudes that 
are not only difficult to overcome, but are unintentionally confirmed or fostered in 
the form of government subsidies to affected populations. It is imperative that the 
 
198 Pete Brodnitz, RTAC National Survey #1421, August 2008, (Washington, D.C.: Benenson 
Strategy Group, 2008), 8. 
199 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Personal Preparedness In America: Findings 
From the Citizen Corps National Survey, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2009), 16. 
200 Ibid., 22. 
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U.S. government adopt public preparedness strategies that undercut not only the 
terrorism “payoff” of an RDD attack in terms of popular fear, but also remove 
doubt from people’s minds regarding the impacts of an RDD event by educating 
and preparing the public in such a way that they are informed and empowered to 
make decisions and build resilience. 
B. U.S. PUBLIC PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8 established an “all-
hazards” national preparedness goal for the United states, and defined all-
hazards preparedness as preparedness for domestic terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies.201 The Citizen and Community Preparedness 
Act of 2008 sought to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and mandated 
the creation within FEMA of a Community Preparedness Division (CPD), 
responsible for all federal, state, local, and tribal efforts towards community 
preparedness.202 The Act further established the existing Citizens Corps and 
Community Emergency Response Team within this division. While the 
Community Preparedness Act has not yet passed, FEMA nonetheless adopted 
these structural changes, and now seeks to achieve all-hazards preparedness 
through engagement and education of all Americans primarily through these 
programs.203  
However, a survey of the major public preparedness programs, including 
Citizens Corps, Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), the Ready 
program, and FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute shows that these 
programs are ill-equipped for the task of educating and preparing the public for a 
 
201 The White House, “December 17, 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-
8,” The White House, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html (accessed 8 March 2010). 
202  The Citizen and Community Preparedness Act of 2008, H.R. 5890, 110th Cong, 2nd 
session, (24 April 2008), Sec. 2101-2103, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-
5890  
203 House, Statement of Timothy Manning, Deputy Administrator, National Preparedness, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Before the 
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, Committee on 
Homeland Security, 1 October 2009, 3–4. http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/ 
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radiological terror attack. These programs are hampered by the all-hazards 
strategy, which lacks comprehensive treatment of the radiological terror threat, 
and by the utilization of public preparedness programs and tools that are not 
integrated and otherwise lack the capability to fulfill their public outreach 
responsibilities.  
1. FEMA Citizens Corps 
Citizen Corps functions as FEMA’s only comprehensive effort to integrate 
federal, state, local, and tribal governments, nongovernmental groups, and 
private sector support for citizen and community preparedness.204 Founded in 
January 2002 as part of President George W. Bush’s USA Freedom Corps 
initiative to advocate a culture of service, citizenship, and responsibility,205 the 
mission of Citizen Corps is: 
To harness the power of every individual through education, 
training and volunteer service to make communities safer, stronger, 
and better prepared to respond to the threats of terrorism, crime, 
public health issues, and disasters of all kinds.206  
Citizen Corps accomplishes its mission by establishing a nationwide 
network of state, local, and tribal Citizen Corps Councils. Citizens Corps Council 
membership may include elected leaders, public and private business 
representatives, civic and faith-based organization leaders, minority groups, and 
the media.207 Citizens Corps Council activities towards public threat education 
and community preparedness functions include: 
• disaster preparedness education;  
• public education and outreach;  
 
204 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Citizen Corps Overview: Powerpoint 
Presentation,” Citizens Corps, http://www.citizencorps.gov/councils/ (accessed 9 February 2010). 
205 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Citizen Corps Press Kit,” Citizens Corps, 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/about.shtm (accessed 9 February 2010). 
206 Citizens Corps, “Citizens Corps Councils,” Citizens Corps, http://www.citizencorps. 
gov/councils/ (accessed 9 February 2010). 
207 Citizens Corps, “A Guide for Local Officials,” Citizens Corps, http://www.citizencorps.gov/ 
councils/ (accessed 9 February 2010). 
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• citizen preparedness, prevention and response capabilities training;  
• promotion of disaster drills at home, work, and school; 
• coordination of citizen participation in community disaster response 
operations; and 
• coordination of volunteer opportunities supporting mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery.208 
Citizens Corps claims 2,421 councils in operation nationwide, serving nearly 
227.5 million people, or 80% of the total U.S. population.209  
a. Partnered Organizations 
Citizens Corps Councils increase community preparedness through 
evaluating community threats, preparedness needs, and capabilities, and 
designing and executing local preparedness, education, and outreach activities. 
Citizens Corps seek also to encourage and create opportunities for volunteer 
participation primarily through five partnered volunteer programs: Community 
Emergency Response Teams (CERT), the Fire Corps, USA On Watch, the 
Medical Reserve Corps, and Volunteers in Police Service.210  
Fire Corps volunteers enhance the capacity of fire and rescue 
departments through fire safety outreach, youth programs, and administrative 
support.211  
USA On Watch, established in 2002, grew from the Neighborhood 




208 Citizens Corps, “Citizens Corps in Action,” Citizens Corps, http://www.citizencorps.gov/ 
councils/ (accessed 9 February 2010). 
209 Citizens Corps Web site, http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/CouncilMapIndex.do? 
citizencorpsMax= 49&citizencorpsMay=24&citizencorpsMap=Citizen+Corps+Councils#map 
(accessed 9 February 2010). 
210 Citizens Corps, “Citizens Corps in Action.” 
211 Citizens Corps, “Citizens Corps Programs and Partners,” Citizens Corps, http://www. 
citizencorps.gov/programs/ (accessed 9 February 2010). 
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preparedness and emergency response. It is administered by the National 
Sheriffs' Association in partnership with the Bureau of Justice Assistance and 
Department of Justice.212  
The Medical Reserve Corps program (MRC) coordinates 
volunteerism among medically trained personnel in communities both before and 
after a disaster. MRC volunteers support existing local emergency response 
programs and supplement public health programs including outreach and 
prevention, immunization, and blood drives. The MRC program is administered 
by HHS.213 
Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS) is the law enforcement 
analogue to the Fire Corps, serving to enhance the capacity of state and local 
law enforcement agencies through volunteer participation. Funded by DOJ, VIPS 
is managed and implemented by the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police.214  
The ultimate purpose of these programs is to improve first 
responder capacity in a disaster event. Volunteers perform various support roles 
that allow local first responders to surge to disaster locations. Presumably, 
community outreach and education regarding the RDD threat would be provided 
through a council’s determination of need and a corresponding volunteer 
organization capability to deliver it.  
2. Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) 
Created by the Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) in 1985 to train 
community members in disaster response, FEMA and the National Fire Academy 
expanded CERT into an all-hazards preparedness program.215 
 
212 Citizens Corps, “Citizens Corps Programs and Partners.” 
213 Ibid.  
214 Ibid. 
215 Citizens Corps, “About CERT,” Citizens Corps, http://www.citizencorps.gov/cert/ 
about.shtm (accessed 8 March 2010). 
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Administered by DHS, CERT is a volunteer program in which members receive 
training on all-hazard disaster preparedness and basic response skills such as 
fire safety, light search and rescue, and disaster medical operations.216 CERT 
members can then assist others in community preparedness and response.217 As 
of March 2010, there are over 3,400 CERT Teams operating nationwide, and it is 
estimated that over 600,000 people have taken the CERT basic training as of 
October 2009.218  
3. FEMA Ready Program 
Ready is FEMA’s national public service campaign to facilitate and 
encourage American emergency preparedness, whether natural or man-made.  
The goal of the campaign is to involve the public and increase basic 
preparedness for all individuals nationwide.   
 The Ready program Web site advises citizens to take basic steps towards 
emergency preparedness: creating three-day emergency supplies kit, 
establishing a family emergency plan, and becoming informed and involved in 
community efforts to improve preparedness.219 The program also includes 
extension programs, including Ready Business, Ready Kids, and Ready 
Classroom, and content for specific social strata, such as pet owners and the 
elderly.220  
FEMA considers Ready a very successful campaign, reporting 33 million 
unique visitors to the www.ready.gov Web site, more than 390,000 calls to 
Ready’s toll-free numbers, and more than 39.6 million Ready materials requested 
 
216 Citizens Corps, “About CERT.”  
217 Citizens Corps, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Citizens Corps Councils and 
Partners,” http://www.citizencorps.gov/programs/ 
218 Citizens Corps, “CERT Map,” http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/CertIndex.do? submitByState 
(accessed 1 March 2010); on basic training numbers, see House, “Statement of Timothy 
Manning,” 2009, 3. 
219 Department of Homeland Security, “Are You Ready?” Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, http://www.ready.gov. (accessed 8 March 2010). 
220 Ibid. 
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or downloaded from the Web as of Sept. 1, 2009. The campaign has also 
generated nearly $800 million in donated media support.221  
Central to the Ready program is FEMA’s preparedness manual, Are You 
Ready? An In-depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness. The 204-page manual 
seeks to inform citizens on the importance of preparedness, achieving 
preparedness, natural and man-made hazards, terrorism, and disaster recovery. 
Individuals can order the guide in hardcopy from FEMA or download it at no cost 
from the ready.gov Web site. The manual includes topics on threats, evacuation, 
public shelters, animals in disaster, and information specific to people with 
disabilities. FEMA also has released a companion video entitled “Getting Ready 
For Disaster.”222 Regarding RDD threat information, the 204-page manual 
includes sections on nuclear blasts, fallout, and RDDs that contain basic 
information on actions to take before, during, and after an attack, to include 
evacuation, sheltering in place, avoiding contaminated areas, and basic personal 
decontamination.  
DHS/FEMA also highlight public preparedness through National 
Preparedness Month (NPM). Created in 2004 as part of the DHS Ready 
campaign, NPM is a nationwide effort held each September to encourage 
disaster preparedness at home, work, and school.223 In 2009, National 
Preparedness Month saw over 2,700 community organizations promoting a 






221 House, (Statement of Timothy Manning), 2009, 5. 
222Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Are You Ready? An In-depth Guide to Citizen 
Preparedness,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/ 
(accessed 9 February 2010). 
223 Department of Homeland Security, “National Organizations Partner to Launch National 
Preparedness Month,” http://www.ready.gov/america/about/pressreleases/release_040810.html 
(accessed 9 February 2010). 
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importance of emergency preparedness. Activities highlighted in 2009 included 
the distribution of emergency preparedness kits, CERT exercises, and 
preparedness-themed civic events.224  
4. FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI) 
EMI serves as the national focal point for the development and provision 
of emergency management training to improve the capabilities of federal, state, 
local, and tribal government officials, volunteer organizations, and public and 
private sectors to minimize disaster impacts.225 EMI offers resident training to 
first responders, and online training to first responders and the public through 
EMI’s Individual Study Program. Offering web-based training in over 62 courses, 
EMI reported that more than 2.8 million individuals participated in the EMI’s ISP 
program In 2007.226 Courses offered through independent study are free, and 
some are eligible for continuing education or college credit. Courses with material 
relevant to improving public awareness and education regarding nuclear and 
radiological hazards, incident response, and stakeholder organizations (and their 








224 Department of Homeland Security, “NPM 2009: Event Review,” http://www.ready.gov/ 
america/npm09/  October 23, 2009 (accessed 9 February 2010).  
225 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Management Institute,” Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, http://training.fema.gov/aboutEMI.asp (accessed 22 February 
2010). 
226 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “EMI History,” Federal Emergency 




Title Topics within course with relevance to public 






Radiation Fundamentals, Radiological Hazards 10 
IS-5.a Introduction to 
Hazardous 
Materials 
Potential terrorist targets, WMD attack signatures, 
Radiological sources in the community, Individual
protection, Community emergency preparedness 
10 







FEMA Ready manual certificate course; develop,
practice, and maintain emergency plans that reflect
what must be done before, during, and after a disaste
 
r
to protect people and their property, develop an





Students demonstrate comprehensive understanding
of radiological protection and response principles,








Radiological basics, biological effects, hazard 
recognition (markings, labels, and placards),
initial response actions, on-scene patient handling, 
radiological terminology and units,  assessing
package integrity, radiation detection instrumentation,
radiological decontamination 
6-8 
Table 1.   FEMA online courses with RDD public preparedness relevance227  
C. PUBLIC PREPAREDNESS FUNDING 
The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) is a FEMA-administered, 
DHS-funded grant program designed to assist community preparedness efforts 
at the state, local, and tribal level. The five component programs under the 
HSGP are a fundamental method for funding and sustaining national 
preparedness capabilities.228 Nearly $269 million in HSGP grant money 
supported all community preparedness programs between 2004-2008, to include 
almost $96 million for Citizens Corps over that time as shown in Table 2.229  
                                            
227 Course topic data is not comprehensive of all topics that are taught in a given course. 
Topics were taken from descriptors in the FEMA EMI Individual Study Program course listing, 
http://www.training.fema.gov/IS/crslist.asp (accessed 22 February 2010). 
228 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Homeland Security 
Grant Program (HSGP) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm (accessed 8 March 2010). 
229 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management GAO-10-105T, 
(Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2010), 16–17. 
  
Table 2.   Homeland Security Grant Programs for Community 
Preparedness230 
Community preparedness grants represent a small part of homeland 
security grant funding, however. While states and urban areas are encouraged to 
leverage funds from the other HSGP programs to additionally provide for Citizens 
Corps so that the program can complete its mission, FEMA grant funding for 
community preparedness programs overall represents less than 2% of the FEMA 
budget.231 Comparatively, in 2008, $3 billion in grants funded prevention, 
protection, response and recovery programs.232 According to the Congressional 
Research Service, and, state and local homeland security assistance programs 
were appropriated $4.2 billion in FY2008 and $4.3 billion in FY2009, as shown in 
Table 3.  
                                            
230 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management GAO-10-105T. 
231 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FY 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP),” Federal Emergency Management Agency, http://www.fema.gov/government/ 
grant/hsgp/index.shtm (accessed 8 March 2010); U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-
10-105T, 2010, 3. 
232 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-105T, 2010, 3. 
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a.  Of the $950 million for SHSGP, 25% must be used for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities 
and $60 million for Operation Stone Garden.  
b.  Of the $838 million for UASI, 25% must be used for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities and 
$15 million for non-profit organization security.  
c.  Of the $400 million for transit security, $25 million must be used for Amtrak security.  
d.  Of the $429 million for training, exercises, and evaluations, $165 million must be used for the National 
Domestic Preparedness Consortium institutions.  
e. The Center for Counterterrorism and Cyber Crime at Norwich University, Northfield,  
Vermont, is a new grant program in FY2009.  
Table 3.   FY2008 and FY2009 Appropriations for State and Local Homeland 
Security Assistance Programs (Amounts in millions)233  
                                            
233 Shawn Reese, FY2009 Appropriations for State and Local Homeland Security-RS22805, 




                                           
D. EFFECTIVENESS OF PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS 
According to the GAO, FEMA community preparedness programs may not 
be as successful as FEMA officials promote. GAO notes that FEMA’s National 
Preparedness Directorate has yet to develop a strategic plan to integrate Citizens 
Corps, partnered programs, and the Ready program into the country’s National 
Preparedness System. Additionally, FEMA metrics for success of its programs, to 
include the numbers of active Citizens Councils, Ready Web site traffic data, and 
valuations of donated media support, may not be reliable indicators of success 
because they are not informative of whether or not they actually changed 
people’s behavior.234 Further, the GAO discovered that FEMA does not have a 
reliable method of determining the number of active Citizens Corps Councils, and 
investigators found that only 12 of 17 councils contacted during their investigation 
were active.235 Also, the donated media support FEMA receives for the Ready 
program consisted primarily of advertising space in local telephone directories, 
and that donated broadcast media included very little prime-time positioning, 
preventing FEMA from controlling the delivery of its core message.236  
The effectiveness of community preparedness efforts receives additional 
criticism from Michael Kindt, whose research into Citizens Corps and partnered 
program success revealed that the success of these programs is low. In 2006, 
Citizens Corps claimed 2,117 active councils, meaning that only about 11% of 
the 19,429 U.S. municipalities were partaking in this program, and claims by 
Citizens Corps of serving high percentages of the population (73%) likely 
indicated the disproportionate establishment of councils near population 
centers.237  
 
234 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-105T, 2010, 6.  
235 Ibid., 8–9. 
236 Ibid., 10–11. 
237Michael T. Kindt, Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks: Unlearned Lessons from 
Military and Civilian Experience, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Counterproliferation 
Center, Air University, 2006), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/kindt.pdf (accessed 
7 March 2010), 22. 
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To update Kindt’s analysis, currently there are 2,430 Citizens Corps 
Councils, claiming to serve 80% of the population,238meaning that only 12.5% of 
communities are utilizing the Citizens Corps program, an increase of only 1.5% in 
almost three-and-a-half years. Considering the GAO finding that 12 of 17 
Citizens Corps councils they contacted were inactive, it is hard to determine if the 
program has really grown at all, and in fact may be stagnating. It is difficult to 
gauge the progress of the Citizens Corps program because Citizens Corps has 
not released an annual report of its activities since 2004.239  
In terms of funding, all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico 
receive a minimum 0.75% of available grant funding. Additionally, American 
Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands each 
receive a minimum of 0.25% percent of total available grant money, while the 
balance is distributed based on population share.240 California’s allocation in FY 
2009, was $1,153,746, and in FY 2010, was $986,002.241 California has 37 
county-level and 81 city-level councils. Assuming equal distribution among all 
councils, and that all councils are in fact active, these councils received around 





238 Citizens Corps, “Citizen Corps Councils Around The Country,” Citizens Corps, 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/CouncilMapIndex.do?nationalCouncilMapForPDFPartner.2.x=46&
nationalCouncilMapForPDFPartner.2.y=22&nationalCouncilMapForPDFPartner.2=Neighborhood
+Watch#map (accessed 7 March 2010). 
239 2004 is the latest annual report available. See Citizens Corps, “News and Events: Annual 
Reports,” Citizens Corps, http://www.citizencorps.gov/news/reports/index.shtm (accessed 7 
March 2010.) 
240 Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program 
Guidance and Application Kit,” Department of Homeland Security, http://www.fema.gov/ 
government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm#5 (accessed 10 March 2010), 28. 
241 Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2009 Homeland Security Grant Program 
Guidance and Application Kit,” Department of Homeland Security, November 2008, 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/hsgp/fy09_hsgp_guidance.pdf, 24; Department of 
Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and 
Application Kit,” Department of Homeland Security, December 2009, http://www.fema.gov/ 
government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm#5 (accessed 10 March 2010), 29. 
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• Establish and sustain a Citizen Corps Council 
• Develop and implement a plan or amend existing plans to achieve and 
expand citizen preparedness and participation 
• Conduct public education and outreach 
• Ensure clear alerts/warnings and emergency communications with the 
public 
• Develop training programs for the public, for both all-hazards 
preparedness and volunteer responsibilities 
• Facilitate citizen participation in exercises 
• Implement volunteer programs and activities to support emergency 
responders. 
• Involve citizens in surge capacity roles and responsibilities during an 
incident in alignment with the Emergency Support Functions and Annexes 
• Conduct evaluations of programs and activities242 
Clearly, states must significantly leverage the other HSGP funding 
vehicles in order to effectively conduct public education outreach in their 
communities if Citizens Corps is to fulfill this role. 
The most encouraging statistic from FEMA, that over 600,000 people have 
taken the CERT basic training, does speak well of FEMA’s efforts to promote 
community activism and build capabilities that will improve response operations 
during a host of disasters. However, it must be said that the CERT training 
manual views terrorist incidents as beyond the training and capability of CERT 
members, and that CERT does not appear to focus its resources towards public 
outreach regarding radiological terrorism. This indicates that for radiological 
terrorism scenarios, not only are the primary programs silent on educating the 
public on the threat, but that the readiness progress they have made will be 
 
242 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Preparedness Grants and Authorized 
Equipment List,” Federal Emergency Management agency, https://www.rkb.us/contentdetail.cfm? 
content_id=227137&GetAELSELCats=1 (accessed 13 March 2010). 
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negated by limitations in operational capability in a radiological contamination 
environment. This cannot be considered all-hazards preparedness.    
E. SUMMARY OF PUBLIC PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS 
DHS and FEMA have undertaken significant efforts since 9/11 to improve 
public disaster preparedness, and yet significant problems remain in the arena of 
outreach and preparedness for radiological terrorism. The current all-hazards 
preparedness approach places all threats into one threat “basket,” resulting in 
preparedness programs to emphasize disaster preparedness in general terms. 
For a member of the lay public to become informed about radiological terrorism 
to the point that it might drive individual behavior towards preparedness, current 
public preparedness programs are problematic.  
FEMA’s main community education and preparedness programs, to 
include Citizens Corps and its partnered organizations, the Ready program, and 
FEMA’s EMI are not authoritative, comprehensive, or mutually supportive 
regarding the radiological threat, and also appear to be underperforming in their 
ability to improve individual readiness, possibly due to funding shortages.  
Citizens Corps and its partnered programs, to include CERT, do not 
appear to be suitably capable to provide comprehensive public education about 
specific WMD threats under an all-hazards strategy, given the tailored approach 
Citizens Corps councils take towards community preparedness, the variability of 
council composition, and the specific aims and capabilities of partnered 
organizations. CERT is unlikely to increase first responder capacity in a 
radiological event due to limitations on CERT training in dealing with terrorism 
and WMD incidents.  Although these organizations may have access to the 
community resources that can provide increased threat education, they are 
probably challenged to maximize their efficiency by focusing on the most 
catastrophic and/or probable disaster scenarios in a given community, such as 
natural disasters. While prudent, this may ensure that some threat education 
never happens.  
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The Ready program also treats radiological threat and response 
information generally, in lacking centralized, in-depth information on the hazard 
and response from start to finish, and in not cross-referencing with more 
comprehensive training resources through FEMA’s own EMI Web site, where 
additional self-study courses for the public are readily available, if perhaps 
tailored more for members of the response community. The Ready program thus 
fails to take a leadership role in informing citizens using information that can build 
public resilience against the radiological terror threat.    
It is unclear, then, how the radiological terror threat is effectively 
communicated to the public through FEMA’s primary public engagement 
programs, Citizens Corps, CERT, or the Ready program. This research indicates, 
however, that radiation remains both very worrisome to the public, and just as 
capable of having significant destructive and long-term impacts on a society as 
more familiar, conventional disasters.    
All but the most trained and proactive citizens in an RDD attack scenario 
will find themselves in a position of immediate dependence on first responders, 
government officials, and the media, despite the goals of community 
preparedness programs to reduce dependence and build resilience in disaster 
scenarios. While the separate community preparedness outreach programs each 
have their own unique beneficial characteristics, taken as a whole they represent 
a piecemeal and under-performing approach to public preparedness. 
According to the May 2008 Bureau of Labor employment statistics and the 
National Fire Protection Association, the first responder community consisting of 
police officers (633,000), firefighters (1.1 million),243 and emergency medical 
technicians (207,000),244 makes up less than 1% of the population. Nonetheless, 
 
243 National Fire Protection Association, “The U.S. Fire Service,” National Fire Protection 
Association, http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.aspcategoryID=955&itemID=23688&URL= 
Research/Fire%20statistics/The%20U.S.%20fire%20service (accessed 10 March 2010). 
244 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “May 2008 National Occupational Employment and Wage 
Estimates,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008/may/oes_nat.htm#b33-
0000 (accessed 10 March 2010).  
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over the last few years, public education outreach programs like Citizens Corps, 
which are vital to community preparedness, receive less than half of FEMA 
community preparedness grant money with which communities must prepare for 
“all” hazards, and only 0.005% of some $3 billion in homeland security grant 
appropriations. Citizens Corps, a primary vehicle for determining community 
readiness strategies and conducting public education outreach, also appears to 
be stagnating, as only 1.5% of U.S. municipalities have established Citizens 
Corps councils in the last three years. 
Arguably, it is not public resilience to radiological terrorism that is growing, 
but responder resilience. This is troublesome considering the observed long-term 
impacts on society from radiological accidents in Brazil, and the former Soviet 
Union, which include significant psychosocial impacts.  Given the demonstrated 
negative public opinion of radiation, the persistent threat of fraudulent access to 
radiological materials, and the problematic pursuit of a technological strategy to 
detect and prevent radiological smuggling, it does not appear that the U.S. can, 
to a high degree of confidence, prevent a radiological attack from occurring, nor 
prevent a radiological attack from having a maximum impact on society. Public 
education outreach and preparedness require much greater efforts.  
  The next chapter will include analysis and recommendations that can 
improve technological and public preparedness strategies. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Protecting the nation from the threat of radiological terrorism involves not 
only deploying effective technological solutions to detect and deny radiological 
weapons and material smuggling, but also developing the public into an 
educated and resilient asset that can minimize the effects of an attack. Current 
government efforts toward RDD threat protection are problematic.  Public 
preparedness programs that are vital to minimizing the impacts of an RDD attack 
receive miniscule resourcing compared to programs that pursue technological 
solutions that are of questionable effectiveness and may be years from securing 
material smuggling pathways. This chapter provides recommendations to 
improve public preparedness and technological strategies against the 
radiological terrorism threat.  
A. THREAT INTERDICTION STRATEGY 
HSPD-8 states that the National Preparedness Goal will establish 
“measurable readiness targets ... that appropriately balance the potential threat 
and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with 
the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.”245 Yet, 
U.S. detection and public preparedness efforts lack an overarching strategy to 
guide these programs. In both technological and public preparedness arenas, 
responsible government agencies are proceeding on congressionally mandated 
guidelines and organizationally derived priorities.246  
In the arena of technological detection and denial, a common theme is the 
lack of adequate strategic planning that creates conflicts with other U.S. 
interests. Under SFI, for example, the feasibility studies for fulfilling the 9/11 Act’s 
congressional mandate to screen 100% of inbound cargo have yet to be 
 
245 The White House, “HSPD-8,” 2003.  
246 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-257, 2009, 6-9;. U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, GAO-10-105T, 2010, 13–14. 
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completed. Nonetheless, the indications from our allies and trading partners are 
that universal screening isn’t sustainable. Further, the mandate for 100% 
screening undermines other incentive-based commercial security programs like 
C-TPAT, as well as the WCO SAFE Framework, which the United States was 
instrumental in developing in the first place.  
Agency detection and denial programs are beset with other problems as 
well. DOE’s Megaports Initiative is criticized by the GAO as lacking long-term 
planning guidance.247 The DNDO RPM program has been accused of using 
hasty and questionable methodology to develop advanced detectors of debatable 
cost-effectiveness. The program ultimately outstripped scarce helium-3 
resources and ground to a halt.248 Further, the inherent limitations of passive 
detection and of the materials needed to create and maintain detection systems 
point to a need for the United States to pursue active detection and multi-spectral 
technologies to achieve the high probabilities for detection that are required to 
prevent illicit material smuggling. Support for research and development of 
alternative detector technologies that are less vulnerable to resource constraints 
is also critical to this effort. 
In the arena of community preparedness, a lack of integrated strategy has 
resulted in the use of Citizens Corps and CERT programs of uncertain and 
limited capability to conduct public education outreach, while the effectiveness of 
programs, and even the membership of primary organizations, is hard to 
quantify. Funding for community preparedness programs is dwarfed by other 
homeland security priorities and the pursuit of technological solutions. The United 
States needs to develop overarching strategies for material detection, denial, and 
public preparedness that are effective beyond individual agencies’ spans of 
control 
 
247 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling GAO-05-375, 
(Washington D.C.: GAO, 2005), 1. 
248 Global Security Newswire “Homeland Security Backs Off Funding for Nuclear-Detection 
Technology” (National Journal Group, May 8, 2009), http://www.globalsecuritynewswire. 
org/gsn/nw_20090508_6590.php (accessed 11 March 2010). 
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1.  Recommendation: Empower the WMD Czar with Strategic 
Development and Funding Oversight Functions 
Currently, the United States is pursuing several suboptimal programs 
because it lacks unity of effort among agency programs and is indifferent to the 
international context in which they operate. Empowering the WMD czar with 
strategic development and funding oversight functions will improve U.S. strategy 
in a number of ways.  
First, it will improve the supervision over, integration among, and 
cooperation between domestic and international counterproliferation efforts. 
Nonproliferation strategy will be less heavy-handed and likely to create problems 
for itself through more consolidated supervision at the national level.  Costly, 
inefficient, and ineffective unilateral programs can be avoided and cooperative 
regimes and resources can be maximized to a more practical extent.  
Funding oversight for technology development can be improved as well. In 
light of the cost-benefit debate surrounding the pursuit of ASPs, Congress 
mandated that the Secretary of DHS must first certify a marked improvement in 
the technology as a pre-condition of spending appropriated funds. The U.S. 
government should expand on this oversight mechanism, and empower the 
WMD czar with radiation detection technology certification authority over DHS, 
DOE, and DOS for border and trade security programs, in order to ensure that 
technological investment follows complementary global and domestic detection 
strategies. With the WMD czar empowered as the certification approval authority 
for technological development, interagency coordination on technology will 
become more streamlined and cooperative, and the government will be in a 
better position to ensure that U.S. security programs are cohesive, integrated, 
and complementary. It is possible that a number of federal programs could be 
optimized or consolidated, and interagency efforts better integrated even while 
remaining organizationally and procedurally unique.   
Second, empowering the WMD czar with strategic oversight authority will 
allow the government to develop a consensus view of the radiological terror 
  76
threat. A consensus view is necessary to balance the mismatch between 
technological and public preparedness strategies, and resolve the mixed 
messages the government sends to its allies, trade partners, and citizens. That 
message currently is that the threat is on the one hand worthy of unilateral 
pursuit, even of potentially placing significant drags on our own economy, yet on 
the other hand does not warrant focused efforts towards public preparedness. 
With WMD czar strategic supervision, the government could establish a clearer 
position on the radiological threat, allowing resources to be committed more 
effectively. U.S. actions would be more even and predictable to our allies and 
trading partners, possibly increasing opportunities for international cooperation.   
It is telling that close U.S. allies like the United Kingdom, which has also 
experienced significant terrorist attacks, curtailed SFI participation because it 
conflicted with other responsibilities, like counter-narcotics. Whether this was a 
smart decision for the U.K. remains to be seen, but the move demonstrates that 
the British do not view SFI as an effective solution to combating the threat. 
Arguably, theirs and other nations’ willingness to forego cooperation indicates 
that the U.S. government must take a hard look at U.S. perception of the threat 
as well as the opportunity costs of detection and denial programs.  
With regard to technological detection, the U.S. is proceeding with 
specific, directed, and costly programs, as if the threat of not only radiological, 
but nuclear attack, is highly credible and imminent. The government operates in 
the technological side of radiological threat reduction as if high degrees of self-
inflicted pain through unilateral efforts are acceptable. On the public education 
outreach and preparedness side; however, the government is proceeding as if 
the radiological threat is one of many threats, and not of such immediacy as to 
warrant similar specific and directed efforts. This dissonance must be resolved.  
2. Promote Research into Alternative Forms of Threat Isotopes 
Cesium chloride is a highly radioactive, soluble, and easily dispersible fine 
powder. It is used in many large industrial sources, and is vital to the fields of 
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medicine and scientific research. In short, the outright banning of this substance 
does not appear to be a practical solution.  Research into the development of 
alternative forms of cesium chloride, to include ceramic and glass formulations, is 
one possibility for reducing the radiological terrorism threat. According to the 
NRC in 2008, development of a possible solution may require 4–5 years and $5 
million in research and development costs, largely in ramping up to a large-scale 
process.249 The NRC has elected to pursue efforts towards securing, rather than 
replacing cesium chloride for the time being. While changing the physical form of 
cesium chloride may not work in all applications, cesium chloride represents a 
large percentage of the total radioactive material of greatest concern. Given what 
appear to be relatively small development costs, research into radioactive source 
alternatives for threat isotopes seems a worthwhile endeavor that should be 
pursued. 
B.  PUBLIC EDUCATION OUTREACH 
Public education outreach is the responsibility of FEMA’s Community 
Preparedness Directorate, which conducts public education outreach primarily 
through the Citizens Corps and CERT programs. This research shows that these 
programs are inadequately organized and resourced to provide public education 
outreach regarding radiological terrorism given their community-based approach 
towards all-hazards preparedness that emphasizes volunteer participation. 
Improvements in threat education and outreach are required in order to build 
greater public resilience.  
While these recommendations are geared at improving government 
agency administered programs, this thesis indicates that the government is not 
viewed by the public as a credible source for terrorism information. Further 
research to determine the pervasiveness of such attitudes and the extent to 
 
249 R.W. Borchardt, “Strategy For the Security and Use of Cesium-137 Chloride Sources, 
SEC-Y-08-0184,” Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 24 November 2008, 5, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2008/ (accessed 10 March 
2010). 
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which various government agencies are viewed as credible to the public will be 
useful in developing the role of government agencies in public education 
outreach. Given the grass-roots approach that promotes civic activism, this thesis 
assumes that Citizens Corps and CERT (and therefore FEMA) can likely avoid 
exposure to such popular negative opinion, making recommendations for their 
improvement appropriate. Arguably, even non-government agencies viewed as 
credible in the public eye could play a significant and beneficial role in improving 
public education outreach. 
1. Recommendation: Improve Public Education Outreach 
a. Improve Existing Education Outreach Programs and 
Create a Simple, Comprehensive Program  
First, FEMA must make public education outreach programs more 
capable and mutually supportive. First, the various education tools FEMA 
employs should be better integrated, drawing on the same comprehensive 
material in order to deliver a consistent message. EMI, the www.ready.gov Web 
site, and the Are You Ready? Manual need to be more comprehensive and 
better integrated, providing the public with enough information to make decisions, 
and directing the public to additional information and training resources as 
required. Curiously, the Are You Ready? Manual does not point the reader to 
additional training resources offered through EMI. 
Second, FEMA should consolidate key topics drawn from the five 
courses EMI offers on radiation awareness and response (which require nearly 
50 hours of individual study to complete) and create one short course tailored for 
use by the general public. Such a course could serve as the basis for instruction 
on the radiological threat by public education outreach organizations. This course 
would also serve as a bridge between EMI’s all-hazards-oriented IS-22 Are You 
Ready? course and the full complement of radiation awareness and response 
courses EMI offers.  
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Regarding course content, people need to understand the threat 
within a social context in order to make safe and informed decisions. This 
includes not only the threat of terrorism, but also those aspects of response and 
mitigation that can inform their preparedness decision making.  The combined 
course on radiological terrorism awareness should describe radiation types, 
effects, and the isotopes that emit them, terrorist aims, the implications of 
clandestine or overt dispersal, and immediate action drills in the event of various 
dispersal scenarios. This will educate people on the different radiological 
scenarios that may occur, and the dangers posed by different isotopes and 
dispersal events. 
More importantly, the course should provide an overview of 
responder actions as well as near, middle, and long-term decision points 
regarding mitigation of the hazard. Knowing not only the hazards, but also the 
decision points and action levels that responders and leaders will face in an 
attack, is key information that can place a radiological attack into a context that 
informs citizens to a degree that drives preparedness behaviors, community 
engagement, or at the very least, steels them into positions of resolve for various 
threat scenarios. First responders own the monitoring equipment that will be 
used to determine the extent of contamination. Citizens will likely want to know 
how that information will get to them; how much radiation will prevent first 
responders from conducting operations; how much of what type of contamination 
the public should be concerned about; and the standards and decisions 
surrounding mitigation of the hazard. Such discussion gets to the heart of 
community involvement, and will increase readiness-seeking behavior.  
b. Improve Education Outreach Program Capabilities  
FEMA must improve Citizens Corps and CERT capabilities to 
conduct education outreach regarding radiological attack, or create additional 
capabilities elsewhere. First, FEMA can leverage EMI, FEMA, DHS, or other 
agency expertise to develop an outreach training program for Citizens Corps and 
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CERT. FEMA could provide the training to county-level Citizens Corps education 
specialists who then provide radiological threat awareness outreach functions. 
This training could also be given as a train-the trainer course to provide training 
down to the community level if desired. Second, FEMA can also leverage the 
expertise of national professional organizations like the Health Physics Society 
through promotion of cooperative public education outreach efforts.  
Regardless of the path chosen, DHS should increase public 
preparedness program funding, and FEMA should develop at least some threat 
education tools for program-wide use, rather than support individual Citizens 
Corps councils spending grant money duplicative education outreach tool 
development. FEMA development of some products could save councils time 
and money.  As a condition of receiving public preparedness grant money, FEMA 
should mandate minimum outreach efforts by programs across the all-hazards 
spectrum, particularly in high-threat areas, to ensure that community-level as well 
as national-level preparedness priorities are met.  
c. Use Targeted Incentives to Increase Public Education 
and Preparedness  
Improving the tools and capabilities of education outreach 
programs will improve preparedness to a degree. Unfortunately, large 
percentages of the population will likely remain unwilling, unable, or uninterested 
in devoting time to radiological threat awareness or preparedness, and may 
never visit a Web site or attend a community preparedness meeting. Admittedly, 
community preparedness for radiological terrorism presents significant barriers to 
the public. Nuclear radiation is undetectable to the human senses, and involves 
scientific concepts and terminology that can be difficult to understand. These 
barriers must be overcome, and one method that may improve readiness is in 
incentivizing preparedness.  
FEMA’s EMI, as noted earlier, offers continuing education and 
college credit for many of its courses. Other programs exist at the state level that 
incentivizes preparedness. Many states incentivize preparedness already. 
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Virginia and Florida offer tax holidays on hurricane readiness supplies. The 
government should consider additional incentives to promote readiness. 
One potential incentive to increase readiness is to offer a tax 
deduction for completing specific preparedness training courses. Some might 
argue that this defeats the purpose of instilling a sense of community and 
individual responsibility towards disaster preparedness. Considering that there 
has not been a significant terrorist attack since 9/11, much less an act of WMD 
terrorism, however, the lay public’s incentive to devote several hours to 
completing distance learning coursework on radiological awareness and 
response is low, despite government warnings of the threat. 
Other incentives could involve partnering with businesses to 
provide tax incentives or even direct funding through homeland security or 
economic stimulus programs to defray the costs of businesses providing an array 
of popular incentives such as gift certificates towards purchases of food, 
entertainment, or merchandise for attending specific education outreach activities 
completing FEMA or DHS-specified training courses through EMI. Imagine an 
individual sees a media ad during National Preparedness Month that offers an 
array of incentives for taking a one-hour online preparedness course. The 
individual takes the course, and the successful completion is recorded by FEMA 
through EMI as a definitive metric of public preparedness participation. The 
individual receives a promotional code (perhaps a number on a course 
certificate) and is then directed to a Web site where several participating 
businesses offer an array of incentives from which the individual may select. The 
individual selects and prints an incentive coupon for use at the participating 
business. The code is used by the participating business to receive tax or funding 
incentives from the government.  
This research has illustrated the significant psychosocial impacts 
that could accompany large radiological accidents and that despite spending 
billions on technology, protection remains problematic. FEMA and elected 
leaders at all levels, particularly those serving populations in high-value target 
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areas, should adopt an investment view towards targeted readiness incentives. 
Tax deductions and other targeted incentives for preparedness training could 
significantly improve public preparedness, in turn reducing costly public 
dependency on responders in a disaster.  
2. Recommendation: Improve Compulsory Education on WMD 
Threats 
Currently, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) offers graduate 
certificate and Master’s degree programs in combating WMD, offering both broad 
and narrow-focused programs in WMD weapon technologies.250 Improving public 
threat education and preparedness doesn’t require anything so elaborate. 
Radiation is already taught in American high school science and physics classes, 
but may lack the practical context that might improve retention beyond the 
classroom. If society views WMD terrorism as a credible threat, then greater 
emphasis on the foundational math, science, history, and social studies concepts 
of WMD threats are worthy pursuits.  
Many may see emphasizing homeland security aspects of public 
education as a slippery slope towards fear-mongering in the classroom. This 
does not need to be the case. Compulsory education should always seek to 
challenge students with lessons that will prepare them to succeed in life, in 
whichever capacity they find themselves. This includes living in an all-hazards 
world. Focusing more on those topics with security relevance and integrating 
those topics across subjects can achieve the desired result without broaching 
concepts like “terrorism” or “homeland security,” although these concepts are 
perfectly appropriate for high school civics courses.  
Setting terrorism aside for a moment, if compulsory education emphasized 
the underlying physics, chemistry, and biology behind radiological terrorism, 
popular misconceptions and fears of radiation would be greatly diminished.  With 
 
250 Air Force Institute of Technology, “Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Program 
Overview,” Air Force Institute of Technology, http://www.afit.edu/en/enp (accessed 11 March 
2010.) 
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American students currently lagging behind their peers in math and science, 
innovation in improving hard-science education is needed.251 While some may 
argue that bringing homeland security and terrorism into the classroom politicizes 
education, it must be said that it nonetheless provides students with additional 
real-world contexts for studying dry and challenging subjects that are often 
lacking in compulsory education.  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
How seriously the United States views the threat of radiological attack is 
not clear from a survey of U.S. government detection, denial, and public 
preparedness strategies. This thesis shows that there is a significant discrepancy 
between technological and education outreach efforts. In terms of technological 
detection and denial strategies, the threat appears to be taken perhaps too 
seriously. It appears that the nation so fears radiological attack, it is willing to 
rush the deployment of technologies of apparently limited effectiveness, and risk 
potentially significant costs through unilateral security programs of unknown 
feasibility. In terms of public education and preparedness, the threat of 
radiological attack appears lost amid the spectrum of natural and man-made 
disasters, without comprehensive and well-resourced programs to increase 
public awareness and encourage preparedness.  
This thesis indicates that the overall U.S. strategic approach is strongly 
biased towards technology, unilateralism, and de-centralization. To the extent 
that U.S. programs are effective, current detection and denial programs build 
local government and responder capabilities rather than an informed and resilient 
nation. This discrepancy can only be resolved through the development of a 
cohesive perception of the threat at the national level.  Currently, U.S. strategy 
fails to develop the public as a national security asset, preserving public 
dependence on government assistance in the event of a radiological attack.   
 
251 CNN, “Obama Pushes Math, Science Education,” CNN, 23 November 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/23/obama.science/index.html (accessed 11 March 2010). 
  84
This thesis indicates that the U.S. government has not done an adequate 
job of calculating the opportunity costs of its radiological terrorism prevention 
strategy in a headlong attempt to achieve security unilaterally. The U.S. 
government risks squandering the resources it ultimately seeks to protect. 
Unilateral efforts regarding the radiological threat could alienate allies and trading 
partners, and incur costs that ultimately affect trade. Unilateral efforts also forego 
cooperative regimes, requiring the commitment of greater resources to achieve 
security than might otherwise be necessary through cooperative regimes.  
The government has also not adequately invested in public preparedness 
against radiological terrorism. The pursuit of highly effective detector technology 
is critical to an effective strategy, but it should be pursued in conjunction with 
public education and preparedness strategies to minimize the potential long-term 
impacts a radiological attack may have on society. Despite U.S. efforts towards 
all-hazards preparedness, the public continues to fear radiation, feels under-
prepared to respond to a radiological attack, is fatalistic on the value of 
preparedness, and views government sources of information on terrorism as 
suspect. Under these conditions, a radiological attack could create the same 
massive burdens on infrastructure and lasting and costly effects on the 
population as occurred in Brazil and the former Soviet Union. Public 
preparedness requires greater federal assistance in the areas of improving 
education outreach program capabilities and resources. Incentives may be useful 
for markedly increasing public education and community preparedness against 
threats such as radiological attack.  
 The United States does not need to “re-invent the wheel” in developing 
comprehensive and effective tools to improve education outreach or 
technological detection programs, however. The United States can make 
significant gains in public preparedness through relatively small changes in 
oversight and investments in improving and expanding existing programs. 
National-level oversight of detection, denial, and public preparedness efforts 
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could overcome the limitations of agency-derived priorities which have resulted in 
suboptimal and disconnected efforts to protect the nation from radiological attack.  
 The United States needs to clearly define the standards of success for its 
various programs, assess its capabilities in each regard, and adjust its strategic 
focus and resourcing to proceed toward effective security in an integrated 
manner. By developing comprehensive education outreach tools and programs 
to increase threat education, making targeted investments in education reform, 
and providing incentives for specific readiness measures, the United States can 
greatly reduce popular misperceptions and fears associated with radiological 
attack, thus transforming the public into a national security asset more secure 
from the potentially harmful effects of a radiological attack. 
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